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FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
STATISTICS, THEORIES, POLICIES, AND BEYOND 
MIKE KOEHLER1 
ABSTRACT 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is not a new law; it was enacted in 
1977. Nevertheless, 2015 was a commemorative year, as it marked the fifth 
anniversary of the Department of Justice declaring a “new era” of FCPA 
enforcement, the fifth anniversary of Congressional FCPA reform hearings, and the 
third anniversary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) issuing FCPA guidance.2 In addition to these mileposts, 2015 
was also a notable year in several other respects as highlighted in this article. 
                                                          
 1 Mike Koehler is an Associate Professor, Southern Illinois University School of Law. 
Professor Koehler is the founder and editor of the website FCPA Professor 
(www.fcpaprofessor) and author of the book THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW 
ERA (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2014). Professor Koehler’s FCPA expertise and views are 
informed by a decade of legal practice experience at a leading international law firm. The 
issues covered in this article, current as of January 1, 2016, assume the reader has sufficient 
knowledge and understanding of the FCPA, as well as FCPA enforcement, including the role 
of the Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission in enforcing the FCPA 
and the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve FCPA scrutiny. Interested readers can 
learn more about these topics and others by reading the author’s FCPA Professor website 
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com), specifically the FCPA 101 page of the site 
(http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101). 
  This article is part of a continuing series of yearly analysis by the author of FCPA 
enforcement data and related issues.   
  For 2014, see Mike Koehler, A Snapshot of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 
SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 143 (2016) [hereinafter Koehler, A Snapshot]. 
  For 2013, see Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative, 22 MICH. ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 961 (2014) [hereinafter Koehler, Narrative]. 
  For 2012, see Mike Koehler, An Examination of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Issues, 
12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 317 (2013). 
  For 2011, see Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the Microscope, 
15 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 1 (2012).  
  For 2010, see Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99 (2011).   
  For 2009, see Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of 
its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389 (2010). 
 2 Interested readers can learn more about these developments at the following sources: A 
Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, DOJ & ENFORCEMENT DIV. SEC 
(Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf; Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: Hearing on S. 111-1005 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010); Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the 
24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, DOJ (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-24th-
national-conference-foreign-corrupt. 
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This article, part of an annual series, paints a picture of FCPA and related 
developments from 2015. Specifically, this article dissects FCPA enforcement in a 
number of ways and highlights meaningful statistics from 2015 as well as historical 
comparisons. Thereafter, this article discusses a range of noteworthy issues from 
2015 such as:  expansive and evolving FCPA enforcement theories, judicial scrutiny 
of FCPA and related enforcement theories, policy pronouncements and 
developments relevant to FCPA issues, and developments beyond the FCPA that 
nevertheless touch upon FCPA issues or are otherwise relevant to a similar space. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article paints a picture of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and related 
developments from 2015. Specifically, Part II of this article dissects FCPA enforcement 
in a number of ways and highlights statistics from 2015 as well as historical comparisons. 
Thereafter, Part III of this article discusses a range of noteworthy issues from 2015 such 
as:  expansive and evolving FCPA enforcement theories, judicial scrutiny of FCPA and 
related enforcement theories, policy pronouncements and developments relevant to 
FCPA issues, and developments beyond the FCPA that nevertheless touch upon FCPA 
issues or are otherwise relevant to a similar space.  
In addressing these topics, this article will benefit anyone seeking an informed base 
of FCPA knowledge and related legal and policy issues in the FCPA’s modern era. 
II. 2015 FCPA ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS AND HISTORICAL COMPARISONS 
Part II of this article dissects FCPA enforcement and highlights meaningful 
statistics from 2015 as well as historical comparisons in the following ways:  
Department of Justice (DOJ) corporate FCPA enforcement, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) corporate FCPA enforcement, aggregate corporate FCPA 
enforcement, and individual FCPA enforcement. 
A. DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement 
As demonstrated in Table I, in two corporate FCPA enforcement actions3 in 2015 
the DOJ collected approximately $24.2 million in settlement amounts. 
                                                          
 3 Corporate FCPA enforcement statistics in this article use the “core” approach. The core 
approach focuses on unique instances of corporate conduct regardless of whether the conduct at issue 
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Table I—2015 DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions  
Company Fine Resolution 
Vehicle4 
Origin5 Related 
Individual 
Action6 
Louis Berger 
International7 
$17.1 million DPA Related civil 
investigation8 
Yes 
IAP Worldwide9 $7.1 million NPA Unclear10 Yes 
Total $24.2 million    
 
As highlighted in Tables II and III below, in 2015 DOJ corporate FCPA 
enforcement, measured both in terms of the number of core actions and settlement 
amounts, was significantly below historical averages. 
                                                                                                                                         
involved a DOJ or SEC enforcement action or both (as is frequently the case), regardless of whether 
the corporate enforcement action involved a parent company, a subsidiary or both (as is frequency the 
case), and regardless of whether the DOJ and/or SEC brought any related individual enforcement 
action (as is occasionally the case). What is an FCPA Enforcement Action?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 7, 
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/what-is-an-fcpa-enforcement-action (providing additional 
information on this method of quantifying FCPA enforcement). This method of computing FCPA 
statistics is consistent with the DOJ’s approach. See Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 22, 
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-72 (quoting DOJ’s FCPA Unit Chief), and is a 
commonly accepted method used by other scholars in other areas. See, e.g., Michael Klausner & Jason 
Hegland, SEC Practice In Targeting and Penalizing Individual Defendants, HARV. LAW SCH. F. ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Sept. 3, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/ 
09/03/sec-practice-in-targeting-and-penalizing-individual-defendants/. 
 4 DPA refers to a deferred prosecution agreement and NPA refers to a non-prosecution 
agreement. To learn more about these agreements in the FCPA context, see Mike Koehler, The 
Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010) [hereinafter Koehler, Façade of FCPA].  
 5 Koehler, Narrative, supra note 1, at 965 n.3. “Refers to the event or events which initially 
prompted the scrutiny that resulted in the FCPA enforcement action.” Id. 
 6 Id. at 965 n.4. “Refers to employees of the corporate entity resolving the FCPA enforcement 
action.” Id. 
 7 Press Release, DOJ, Louis Berger International Resolves Foreign Bribery Charges (July 17, 
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/louis-berger-international-resolves-foreign-bribery-charges 
[hereinafter Louis Berger International]. 
 8 DOJ Enforcement of the FCPA—Year in Review, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 6, 2016), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/doj-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-year-in-review-6/ [hereinafter, 2016 Year in 
Review]. The DPA states: “after the government had made [the company] . . . aware of a False 
Claim Act investigation, [the company] conducted an internal investigation, discovered potential 
FCPA violations, and voluntarily self-reported to the [DOJ] the misconduct.” Id. 
 9 IAP Worldwide Services Inc. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (June 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iap-worldwide-services-inc-resolves-
foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation [hereinafter IAP Worldwide Services]. 
 10 See id. The NPA makes no mention of voluntary disclosure or other potential origins of the 
action. 
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Table II—Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010–2015) 
Year Core Actions 
2015 211 
2014 712 
2013 713 
2012 914 
2011 1115 
2010 1716 
Table III—Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts (2010–2015) 
Year Settlement Amounts 
2015 $24.2 million17 
2014 $1.25 billion18 
2013 $420 million19 
2012 $142 million20 
2011 $355 million21 
2010 $870 million22 
                                                          
 11 Corporate FCPA Enforcement in 2015 Compared to Prior Years, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 7, 
2016), http://fcpaprofessor.com/corporate-fcpa-enforcement-in-2015-compared-to-prior-years/ 
[hereinafter Corporate Enforcement in 2015]. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
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Tempting as it might be, few meaningful conclusions should be drawn from 2015 
DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement. For starters, year-to-year FCPA enforcement 
statistics, and the arbitrary cutoffs associated with them, are of marginal value given 
that many non-substantive factors can influence the timing of an actual corporate 
FCPA enforcement action.23 Moreover, and as highlighted in more detail in Table 
VII below, FCPA enforcement statistics in most years are impacted by a few unique 
events and often one or a small group of enforcement actions significantly skew 
enforcement statistics.24  
Notwithstanding the above limitations of yearly enforcement statistics, not to 
mention the small quantity of DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2015 on 
which to calculate statistics, two statistics are nevertheless noteworthy. 
The first notable statistic is that both enforcement actions were resolved through 
either a non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”) or deferred prosecution agreement 
(“DPA”).25 These resolutions are consistent with the FCPA’s modern trend of the 
DOJ resolving corporate FCPA enforcement actions through such controversial 
alternative resolution vehicles.26 Indeed, since 2010 approximately 85% of corporate 
DOJ enforcement actions have involved either an NPA or DPA.27  
The second notable statistic is that both corporate enforcement actions in 2015 
also included related charges against company employees.28 While such actions may 
seem like an obvious result given that business organizations can only be exposed to 
criminal FCPA violations based on the conduct of actual employees,29 this 2015 
statistic is notable because 72% of DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions since 
2008 have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company 
                                                          
 23 Koehler, A Snapshot, supra note 1. Because FCPA enforcement actions that involve 
both a DOJ and SEC component are typically announced on the same day, and because the 
DOJ and SEC are separate enforcement agencies, it is common for FCPA enforcement actions 
to be delayed while one agency waits for the other to finish its investigation of the conduct at 
issue and its negotiation of a resolution with a company. Additional non-substantive factors 
that can influence the timing of an FCPA enforcement action, although far from an exclusive 
list, include DOJ and SEC staffing issues (including employee departures or leaves) as well as 
securing corporate board approval for resolving an FCPA enforcement action. Id. 
 24 In this regard, in 2016 there may be an approximate $900 million enforcement action 
that alone will eclipse total FCPA settlement amounts in several prior years. See The 
Burgeoning Uzbekistan Telecommunication Investigations, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-burgeoning-uzbekistan-telecommunication-investigations. 
 25 Koehler, Façade of FCPA, supra note 4, at 909. 
 26 To learn more about NPAs and DPAs, including why such alternative resolution 
vehicles are controversial, see, e.g., Koehler, Narrative, supra note 1; Koehler, Façade of 
FCPA, supra note 4; Mike Koehler, Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution Agreements 
and Deferred Prosecution Agreements on FCPA Enforcement, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 499 
(2015) [hereinafter Koehler, Measuring the Impact]. 
 27 2016 Year in Review, supra note 8. 
 28 A Focus on DOJ Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 12, 2016), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-doj-individual-actions.  
 29 Id. 
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employees.30 Only time will tell whether 2015 was the beginning of a trend reversal 
on prosecution of company employees or merely a statistical outlier.  
B. SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement 
As demonstrated in Table IV, in nine corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 
2015 the SEC collected approximately $114.8 million in settlement amounts. 
Table IV—2015 SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions 
Company Settlement 
Amount 
Resolution 
Vehicle 
Origin Related 
Individual 
Action 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb31 
$14.7 million Administrative 
Order 
Unclear No 
Hyperdynamics32 $75,000 Administrative 
Order 
SEC 
investigation33 
No 
Hitachi34 $19.1 million Settled Civil 
Complaint 
Unclear No 
BNY Mellon35 $14.8 million Administrative 
Order 
Unclear No 
Mead Johnson36 $12 million Administrative 
Order 
SEC 
investigation37 
No 
                                                          
 30 Id. (emphasis in original). For a hypothesis why so few DOJ corporate enforcement 
actions result in related charges against company employees, see Koehler, Measuring the 
Impact, supra note 26. 
 31 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb With FCPA Violations (Oct. 5, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-229.html. 
 32 Hyperdynamics Announces Settlement with the SEC, HYPERDYNAMICS (Sept. 29, 2015), 
http://investors.hyperdynamics.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=934289. 
 33 According to the company’s disclosure—“the SEC had issued a subpoena to 
Hyperdynamics concerning possible violations of the FCPA.” Id. 
 34 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Hitachi With FCPA Violations (Sept. 28, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-212.html.  
 35 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges BNY Mellon With FCPA Violations (Aug. 18, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-170.html [hereinafter BNY Mellon].  
 36 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Mead Johnson Nutrition With FCPA Violations (July 
28, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-154.html [hereinafter Mead Johnson].  
 37 The administrative order states:  
In 2011, Mead Johnson received an allegation of possible violations of the FCPA in 
connection with the Distributor Allowance in China. In response, Mead Johnson 
conducted an internal investigation, but failed to find evidence that Distributor 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/6
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Company Settlement 
Amount 
Resolution 
Vehicle 
Origin Related 
Individual 
Action 
BHP Billiton38 $25 million Administrative 
Order 
SEC 
investigation39 
No 
FLIR Systems40 $9.5 million Administrative 
Order 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Yes 
Goodyear Tire 
and Rubber Co.41 
$16.3 million Administrative 
Order 
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
No 
The PBSJ 
Corporation42 
$3.4 million DPA Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Yes 
 
As highlighted in Tables V and VI below, SEC corporate FCPA enforcement in 2015 
was up slightly compared to historical averages, even though the slight increase in 
enforcement activity resulted in settlement amounts lower than historical averages. 
 
Table V—Corporate SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010–2015) 
Year Core Actions 
2015 943 
                                                                                                                                         
Allowance funds were being used to make improper payments to HCPs. Thereafter, 
Mead Johnson China discontinued Distributor Allowance funding to reduce the 
likelihood of improper payments to HCPs, and discontinued all practices related to 
compensating HCPs by 2013. Mead Johnson did not initially self-report the 2011 
allegation of potential FCPA violations and did not thereafter promptly disclose the 
existence of this allegation in response to the Commission’s inquiry into this matter. 
In the Matter of Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., at 4 (July 28, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-75532.pdf.  
 38 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges BHP Billiton With Violating FCPA at Olympic Games 
(May 20, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-93.html [hereinafter BHP Billiton]. 
 39 The company disclosed that it received information requests from the SEC in August 
2009. See Issues To Consider From The Recent BHP Billiton Enforcement Action, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (May 27, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/issues-to-consider-from-the-
recent-bhp-billiton-enforcement-action.  
40 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Oregon-Based Defense Contractor With FCPA 
Violations (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-62.html. 
41 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Goodyear With FCPA Violations (Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-38.html#.VOy19fnF91Z. 
42 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Executive at Tampa-Based Engineering Firm 
With FCPA Violations (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-13.html 
[hereinafter Tampa-Based Engineering Firm]. 
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2014 744 
2013 845 
2012 846 
2011 1347 
2012 1948 
 
Table VI—SEC FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts (2010–2015) 
Year Settlement Amounts 
2015 $114 million49 
2014 $327 million50 
2013 $300 million51 
2012 $118 million52 
2011 $148 million53 
2010 $530 million54 
For the same reasons discussed above, few meaningful conclusions should be 
drawn from 2015 SEC corporate FCPA enforcement. Nevertheless, two statistics are 
noteworthy. 
The first noteworthy statistic is that eight of the nine corporate enforcement 
actions (89%) in 2015 were resolved either through an administrative order or a 
DPA.55 As a result of these controversial resolution vehicles, there was no judicial 
scrutiny of 89% of SEC FCPA enforcement actions from 2015.56 This statistic is 
consistent with a clear trend regarding SEC corporate FCPA enforcement. For 
                                                                                                                                         
 43 2016 Year in Review, supra note 8. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. It should be noted that the numbers in Table VI are approximate figures. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
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instance, in 2014 there was no judicial scrutiny of 86% of SEC FCPA enforcement 
actions,57 and in 2013 there was no judicial scrutiny of 50% of SEC FCPA 
enforcement actions.58 
The second noteworthy statistic is that seven of the nine corporate enforcement 
actions (78%) in 2015 did not result in related enforcement actions against company 
employees.59 Again, this statistic is consistent with prior years as 83% of corporate 
SEC FCPA enforcement actions since 2008 have not (at least yet) resulted in any 
related charges of company employees.60 Similar to the criminal context, business 
organizations only can be exposed to civil FCPA violations based on the conduct of 
actual employees.61 Indeed, the 83% statistic is even more striking than the 
comparable 72% DOJ statistic given that the SEC, as a civil law enforcement 
agency, has a lower burden of proof in an enforcement action.62  
Analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data separately in Tables I through 
VI above is informative given that the DOJ and SEC are separate law enforcement 
agencies and different issues may arise in DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement 
actions.63 On the other hand, analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data in the 
aggregate is also informative because such a perspective provides a more holistic 
view of FCPA enforcement.   
C. Aggregate Corporate FCPA Enforcement 
In 2015, the DOJ and SEC together collected approximately $139 million in 
eleven core corporate enforcement actions.64 The average settlement amount was 
                                                          
 57 Id. For an extended discussion of the origins and controversy of SEC administrative 
orders and DPAs, see Koehler, A Snapshot, supra note 1, at 166-69. 
 58 2016 Year in Review, supra note 8.  
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-sec-individual-actions. 
 62 FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 11, 2016), http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101/ 
(found under drop down menu labeled “Q. What about FCPA-related civil litigation?”).  
 63 As a civil law enforcement agency, the SEC’s burden of proof is preponderance of the 
evidence compared to the DOJ’s criminal burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. How 
Rare Are Parallel DOJ And SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions Against Individuals?, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Aug. 14, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/how-rare-are-parallel-doj-and-sec-fcpa-
enforcement-actions-against-individuals/ [hereinafter How Rare].     
 64 As a general matter, the SEC has jurisdiction over “issuers” (companies —domestic and 
foreign—with shares registered on a U.S. exchange or otherwise required to make filings with 
the SEC). Comparing DOJ FCPA Enforcement to SEC FCPA Enforcement is Not a Valid 
Comparison, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 17, 2014), http://fcpaprofessor.com/comparing-doj-fcpa-
enforcement-to-sec-fcpa-enforcement-is-not-a-valid-comparison/ [hereinafter Not a Valid 
Comparison]. In other words, the SEC generally does not have jurisdiction over private 
companies or foreign companies that are not issuers. Id. Thus, the two DOJ corporate 
enforcement actions from 2015 did not have an SEC component because the companies 
(Louis Berger International and IAP Worldwide) were private companies not subject to SEC 
jurisdiction. 2016 Year in Review, supra note 8. As a general matter, the DOJ has criminal 
jurisdiction over “issuers,” “domestic concerns,” (i.e. any business entity with a principal 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
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approximately $12.6 million and the median was approximately $14.7 million.65 The 
range of settlements was, on the high end, $25 million (BHP Billiton),66 and on the 
low end, $75,000 (Hyperdynamics).67 
A popular issue, or so it seems, is to analyze whether corporate FCPA 
enforcement is up or down in any given year compared to prior years. Again, year-
to-year FCPA enforcement statistics, and the arbitrary cutoffs associated with them, 
are of marginal value given that many non-substantive factors can influence the 
timing of an actual corporate FCPA enforcement action. 
Nevertheless, and accepting year-to-year FCPA statistics for what they are, the 
issue remains:  how best to analyze and interpret FCPA statistics over time? 
Consider the following analogy. In Year One, a city issues 100 speeding tickets and 
collects $20,000 in fines on those tickets. In Year Two, a city issues ninety speeding 
tickets; however, because certain drivers were going really fast, the city collects 
$25,000 in fines on those tickets. Was there less enforcement in Year Two compared 
to Year One? Most, it is assumed, would say that enforcement in Year Two was less 
than in Year One even though the city collected more money from speeding tickets 
in Year Two.   
The same logic applies to year-to-year FCPA statistics and the more accurate and 
reliable way to keep and analyze FCPA enforcement statistics is by focusing on 
unique instances of FCPA scrutiny (not settlement amounts) and tracking 
enforcement actions using the ‘core’ approach.68 Using this approach, corporate 
FCPA enforcement in 2015 was up slightly compared to 2014 and 2013 and 
generally consistent with historical norms, notwithstanding the fact that DOJ 
corporate enforcement in 2015 was substantially down compared to prior years and 
that settlement amounts in 2015 were significantly below historical averages.69 
These points are best demonstrated by the below table which aggregates DOJ and 
SEC enforcement statistics over time and highlights unique circumstances which 
significantly skewed enforcement data statistics in any particular year. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
place of business in the U.S. or organized under U.S. law), and non-U.S. companies and 
persons to the extent a bribery scheme involved conduct while in the territory of the U.S. Not 
a Valid Comparison, supra note 64. Compared to the SEC’s civil burden of proof of 
preponderance of the evidence, the DOJ has a higher beyond a reasonable doubt burden of 
proof in a criminal prosecution. How Rare, supra note 63. 
A notable statistic from 2015—in contrast to prior years—is that each SEC corporate 
enforcement action, actions in which the DOJ theoretically could have also brought an action, 
did not result in a parallel DOJ enforcement action. 2016 Year in Review, supra note 8.  
 65 Corporate Enforcement in 2015, supra note 11. 
 66 2016 Year in Review, supra note 8.  
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Corporate Enforcement in 2015, supra note 11. 
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Table VII—Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007–2015) 
Year Core Settlement 
Amounts 
Of Note 
2007 15 $149 
million 
Six enforcement actions involved Iraq Oil for 
Food conduct and these enforcement actions 
comprised 40% of all enforcement actions and 
approximately 50% of the $149 million amount.70 
2008 10 $885 
million 
The $800 million Siemens enforcement action 
comprised approximately 90% of the $885 million 
amount.71 
2009 11 $654 
million 
The $579 million KBR / Halliburton Bonny 
Island, Nigeria enforcement action comprised 
approximately 90% of the $645 million amount.72 
2010 21 $1.4 billion 
Six enforcement actions, all resolved on the 
same day, involved various oil and gas companies’ 
use of Panalpina in Nigeria. Panalpina also resolved 
an enforcement action on the same day.73 
 
Two enforcement actions (Technip and Eni / 
Snamprogetti) involved Bonny Island conduct.74 
 
In other words, there were 14 unique corporate 
enforcement actions in 2010. Of further note, the 
two Bonny Island enforcement actions, 
Technip($338 million) and Eni/Snamprogetti ($365 
million) comprised approximately 50% of the $1.4 
billion amount.75 
2011 16 $503 
million 
The $219 million JGC Corp. enforcement action 
involved Bonny Island conduct and comprised 
approximately 44% of the $503 million amount.76 
2012 12 $260 
million 
No enforcement actions significantly skewed 
the statistics.77 
                                                          
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
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Year Core Settlement 
Amounts 
Of Note 
2013 9 $720 
million 
The $398 million Total enforcement action 
comprised approximately 55% of the $720 million 
amount.78 
2014 10 $1.6 billion Two enforcement actions (Alstom - $772 million 
and Alcoa - $384 million) comprised 
approximately 72% of the $1.6 billion amount.79 
2015 11 $139 
million 
No enforcement actions significantly skewed the 
statistics.80 
Totals 115 $6.37 
billion 
 
D. Individual FCPA Enforcement 
FCPA enforcement by the DOJ and SEC against business organizations is just 
one prong of FCPA enforcement. Both the DOJ and SEC have repeatedly stressed 
the importance of also enforcing the FCPA against individuals.81 For instance, DOJ 
FCPA Unit Chief Patrick Stokes stated that the DOJ is “very focused” on 
prosecuting individuals as well as companies and that “going after one or the other is 
not sufficient for deterrence purposes.”82 Likewise, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General Sung-Hee Suh stated that “the prosecution of individuals for corporate 
wrongdoing has been and continues to be a high priority for the Criminal Division 
and for the Justice Department as a whole.”83 Similarly, SEC Enforcement Director 
Andrew Ceresney stated, “Holding individuals accountable for their wrongdoing is 
critical to effective deterrence and, therefore, the Division considers individual 
liability in every case. . . . The Commission is committed to holding individuals 
accountable and I expect you will continue to see more FCPA cases against 
individuals.”84 The next section highlights 2015 DOJ and SEC individual FCPA 
enforcement actions as well as historical comparisons. 
                                                          
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, supra note 61.  
 82 DOJ Prosecution of Individuals—Are Other Factors at Play?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 
21, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-prosecution-of-individuals-are-other-factors-at-
play-4. 
 83 Sung-Hee Suh, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Keynote at the ABA-CJS Global White 
Collar Crime Institute 2015, 3 (Nov. 19, 2015), (transcript available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/criminal_justice/2015/2015shanghai_key
note.authcheckdam.pdf). 
 84 Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, Keynote Address at the ACI’s 32nd FCPA 
Conference, 4 (Nov. 17, 2015), (transcript available at 
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As demonstrated in Table VIII, in 2015 the DOJ filed or announced FCPA 
criminal charges against eight individuals.   
Table VIII—2015 DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions 
Individual Employer/Former 
Employer 
Related Corporate 
Enforcement Action 
Roberto Rincon 
Abraham Shiera85 
Various Private 
Companies Seeking 
Business with Petroleos 
de Venezuela S.A. 
No 
Daren Condrey86 Transports Logistic 
International 
No 
Vicente Garcia87 SAP International No 
Richard Hirsch 
James McClung88 Louis Berger 
International 
Yes 
James Rama89 
IAP Worldwide Services Yes 
Dmitrij Harder90 
Chestnut Consulting 
Group Inc. 
No 
 
As highlighted in Table IV, the number of DOJ individual FCPA enforcement 
actions in 2015 was generally below historical averages. 
                                                                                                                                         
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-fcpa-keynote-11-17-15.html) [hereinafter 
Ceresney, Keynote Address]. 
 85 See Indictment at 4, United States v. Roberto Enrique Rincon-Fernandez, No. 15CR654, 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/294158102/U-S-v-Rincon-Shiera-Indictment. 
 86 See Press Release, DOJ, Russian Nuclear Energy Official Pleads Guilty to Money 
Laundering Conspiracy Involving Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, (Aug. 31, 
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-nuclear-energy-official-pleads-guilty-money-
laundering-conspiracy-involving. 
 87 See Press Release, DOJ, Former Executive Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Bribe 
Panamanian Officials (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-executive-
pleads-guilty-conspiring-bribe-panamanian-officials. 
 88 See Louis Berger International, supra note 7. 
 89 See IAP Worldwide Services, supra note 9.  
 90 See Press Release, DOJ, Former Owner and President of Pennsylvania Consulting 
Companies Charged with Foreign Bribery (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-owner-and-president-pennsylvania-consulting-
companies-charged-foreign-bribery. 
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
170 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:157 
 
Table IX—DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007–2015)91 
Year Individual Charged with Criminal 
FCPA Offenses 
2015 8 
2014 10 
2013 12 
2012 2 
2011 10 
2010 33 (including 22 in the Africa Sting Case) 
2009 18 
2008 14 
2007 7 
 
As demonstrated in Table X, in 2015 the SEC brought FCPA civil charges 
against 2 individuals. 
Table X—2015 SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions 
Individual Employer/Former 
Employer 
Related Corporate 
Enforcement Action 
Vicente Garcia92 SAP International No 
Walid Hatoum93 The PBSJ Corporation Yes 
 
As highlighted in Table XI, similar to the above DOJ historical comparison, 
while the number of SEC individual FCPA enforcement actions in 2015 was 
generally consistent with the prior two years, the number of actions was generally 
below historical averages. 
                                                          
 91 See A Focus on DOJ Individual Actions, supra note 28.  
 92 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former Software Executive With FCPA 
Violations (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-165.html. 
 93 Tampa-Based Engineering Firm, supra note 42. 
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Table XI—SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007–2015)94 
Year Individuals Charged With Civil 
FCPA Offenses 
2015 2 
2014 2 
2013 0 
2012 4 
2011 12 
2010 7 
2009 5 
2008 5 
2007 7 
 
III. NOTEWORTHY ISSUES FROM 2015 
With a proper foundation in FCPA statistics both in 2015 and over time, Part III 
of this article discusses a range of noteworthy issues from 2015 such as:  expansive 
and evolving FCPA enforcement theories, judicial scrutiny of FCPA and related 
enforcement theories, policy pronouncements and developments relevant to FCPA 
issues, and developments beyond the FCPA that nevertheless touch upon FCPA 
issues or are otherwise relevant to a similar space. 
A. Expansive and Evolving FCPA Enforcement Theories 
As highlighted above, approximately 80% of corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions in 2015 were brought by the SEC.95 As discussed below, most of these 
enforcement actions were based on expansive, evolving—and controversial—
enforcement theories not subjected to any judicial scrutiny because of the resolution 
vehicles typically used by the SEC.96  
                                                          
 94 See A Focus on SEC Individual Actions, supra note 61.  
 95 See A Focus on DOJ Individual Actions, supra note 28; see also A Focus on SEC 
Individual Actions, supra note 61.  
 96 See generally BNY Mellon, supra note 35; Mead Johnson, supra note 36; BHP Billiton, 
supra note 38.  
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In the minds of some, the FCPA is simple: “Just don’t bribe.”97 However, more 
sophisticated observers recognize the absurdity of such an absolutist position. In 
short, a company can do things with customer or prospective customer X and it is 
generally not a legal violation. Yet, when the same company does the same thing 
with customer or prospective customer Y the U.S. government might call it bribery. 
Several SEC corporate enforcement actions from 2015 highlight this controversial 
aspect of FCPA enforcement.98 
Consistent with several prior enforcement actions in the FCPA’s modern era,99 
the SEC brought two enforcement actions against healthcare companies for their 
alleged corrupt interactions with physicians employed by foreign healthcare systems. 
In the first enforcement action, Mead-Johnson, without admitting or denying the 
SEC’s findings in an administrative cease-and-desist order, agreed to pay 
approximately $12 million based on the following SEC’s findings: 
Despite prohibitions in the FCPA and Mead Johnson’s internal policies, 
certain employees of Mead Johnson’s majority-owned subsidiary in China 
. . . (“Mead Johnson China”), made improper payments to certain health 
care professionals (“HCPs”) at state-owned hospitals in China to 
recommend Mead Johnson’s nutrition products to, and provide 
information about, expectant and new mothers.100 
The Mead Johnson enforcement action contained several other notable features. 
For starters, the action lacked any meaningful factual allegation against the corporate 
defendant resolving the action. Rather, the SEC merely found in conclusory fashion 
that:  (i) “Mead Johnson China’s books and records were consolidated into Mead 
Johnson’s books and records, thereby causing Mead Johnson’s consolidated books 
and records to be inaccurate;” and (ii) “Mead Johnson failed to devise and maintain 
an adequate system of internal accounting controls over Mead Johnson China’s 
operations sufficient to prevent and detect the improper payments that occurred over 
a period of years.”101  
Moreover, the SEC made seemingly contradictory findings regarding Mead 
Johnson’s internal controls. On the one hand, the SEC found: 
Mead Johnson has established internal policies to comport with the FCPA 
and local laws, and to prevent related illegal and unethical conduct. Mead 
Johnson’s internal policies include prohibitions against providing 
improper payments and gifts to HCPs that would influence their 
recommendation of Mead Johnson’s products. . . . The use of the 
                                                          
 97 “Good Companies Don’t Bribe—Period” was the title of a Minneapolis Star Tribune 
business column which assailed those who have criticized various aspects of the FCPA or 
FCPA enforcement. See Issues to Consider from the Recent BHP Billiton Enforcement Action, 
supra note 39.  
 98 See generally BNY Mellon, supra note 35; Mead Johnson, supra note 36; BHP Billiton, 
supra note 38. 
 99 See 2 Enforcement Theories, 17 DOJ Corporate Enforcement Actions, 0 Individual 
Prosecutions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 24, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/2-enforcement-
theories-17-doj-corporate-enforcement-actions-0-individual-prosecutions./. 
 100 In the Matter of Mead Johnson Nutrition Co., supra note 37, at 2.  
 101 Id. at 2, 4.  
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Distributor Allowance to improperly compensate HCPs was contrary to 
management’s authorization and Mead Johnson’s internal policies.102 
Yet on the other hand, the SEC order also found that “Mead Johnson failed to 
devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls over Mead 
Johnson China’s operations sufficient to prevent and detect the improper payments 
that occurred over a period of years.”103 
In the second enforcement action against a healthcare company, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings in an administrative cease-
and-desist order, agreed to pay $14.7 million based on the following SEC findings: 
Through various mechanisms . . . certain sales representatives of [a joint 
venture of a Chinese subsidiary] improperly generated funds that were 
used to provide corrupt inducements to [healthcare professionals] in the 
form of cash payments, gifts, meals, travel, entertainment, and 
sponsorships for conferences and meetings in order to secure new sales 
and increase existing sales.104 
The Bristol-Myers Squibb enforcement action, like the Mead-Johnson action and 
many others from prior years, subjected corporate interaction with foreign healthcare 
professionals to different standards than interaction with U.S. healthcare 
professionals who frequently receive gifts, meals, sponsorships for conferences, and 
other things of value from healthcare companies.105 
SEC enforcement actions in 2015 against BHP Billiton and BNY Mellon further 
highlight the absurdity of the absolutist “just don’t bribe” position. The key findings 
from the SEC’s administrative cease-and-desist order against BHP Billiton 
(“BHPB”), which the company neither admitted nor denied, were as follows:106 
“[B]HP Billiton was an official sponsor of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, 
China.107 As such, the company received ‘priority access to tickets, hospitality suites 
and accommodations for during the games.’108 Not surprisingly, the company invited 
650 people (customers, suppliers, etc.) to attend the Olympic Games with three to 
four day hospitality packages.109 According to the SEC’s findings, approximately 
                                                          
 102 Id. (numeration omitted). 
 103 Id. 
 104 In the Matter of Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., at 2 (Oct. 5, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-76073.pdf. 
 105 To learn more about this double standard in the healthcare context, see Mike Koehler, 
The Uncomfortable Truths and Double Standards of Bribery Enforcement, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 525 (2015) [hereinafter Koehler, The Uncomfortable Truths]. 
 106 See BHP Billiton, supra note 38; see also Scott Patterson, SEC Fines BHP $25 Million 
After Gifts Probe, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-charges-bhp-
with-violating-fcpa-at-2008-summer-olympics-1432127870.    
 107 Patterson, supra note 106.  
 108 Id.  
 109 See In the Matter of BHP Billiton Ltd. and BHP Billiton PLC (May 20, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74998.pdf. 
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75% of these invitees were not alleged ‘foreign officials.’ Thus no problem.110 
However, the SEC found that approximately 25% of the people invited were alleged 
‘foreign officials’ primarily from Africa and Asia and that an even smaller 
percentage of these invited ‘foreign officials’ actually attended the Olympic 
Games.”111 
Based on the above findings, the SEC found: 
BHPB recognized that inviting government officials to the Olympics 
created a heightened risk of violating anti-corruption laws and the 
company’s own Guide to Business Conduct, but the internal controls it 
developed and relied upon in an effort to address this risk were 
insufficient. As a result, BHPB invited government officials who were 
directly involved in, or in a position to influence, pending contract 
negotiations, efforts to obtain access rights, regulatory actions, or business 
dealings affecting BHPB in multiple countries. In addition, BHPB’s 
books and records, namely certain internal forms that employees prepared 
in order to invite a government official to the Olympics, did not, in 
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect BHPB’s pending 
negotiations or business dealings with the government official at the time 
of the invitation.112 
From a settlement amount perspective, the $25 million BHPB enforcement action 
was the largest corporate enforcement action of 2015 and the second largest SEC 
only FCPA enforcement action of all-time.113 The fact that a travel and entertainment 
action such as BHPB represented the second largest SEC only FCPA enforcement 
action of all-time is remarkable and further demonstrates that FCPA settlement 
amounts seem to be getting bigger each year just because.114 
With good reason, the BHPB enforcement action generated much critical 
commentary in the FCPA space. FCPA practitioners at Debevoise & Plimpton 
rightly noted: 
[The BHPB enforcement action] may well turn out to be one of the more 
notable FCPA resolutions in several years. This is because the case 
addresses issues of recurring concern to multinational corporations that 
have long been sought out as sponsors of—or, at least, purchasers of 
hospitality packages for—marquee sporting events.  
 
As good corporate citizens, these firms have come to view the purchase of 
tickets and hospitality packages as part of the collaboration with host 
entities managing such events, including national governments. This is an 
                                                          
 110 Id. at 4.  
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. (numeration omitted). 
 113 See Issues to Consider from the Recent BHP Billiton Enforcement Action, supra note 39 
(meaning the enforcement action only involved an SEC component). 
 114 See Have FCPA Settlement Amounts Increased . . . Just Because?, FCPA PROFESSOR 
(Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/have-fcpa-settlement-amounts-increased-just-
because. 
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integral element of brand management and corporate strategy. In the 
course of such collaboration, these companies also receive due credit for 
making the event a successful interlude during which governments, 
business, and society at large, pause to celebrate the endeavor of sport. 
Yet the very process of supporting such an event leads to the inevitable 
question of “whom may we invite?” From there, the issue of anti-bribery 
compliance becomes a central issue for in-house compliance personnel.  
 
The BHPB resolution likely will lead U.S. issuers choosing to provide 
hospitality of this kind to expend significant additional time, resources, 
and money devising and maintaining controls suggested by the resolution. 
Even though the settlement lacks the force of law, it will no doubt raise 
considerable pressure on companies to exercise even greater care if 
inviting foreign officials to such events, and may cause some firms 
subject to the books and records and internal controls provisions of the 
FCPA, i.e., those subject to SEC jurisdiction, to reconsider altogether this 
practice.115 
Similarly, FCPA practitioners at Steptoe & Johnson rightly noted: 
This settlement . . . represents one of the most aggressive uses by the SEC 
to date of its accounting, and particularly its internal controls, authorities 
in an FCPA context. Instead of being predicated on specific questionable 
payments, the factual basis of the charges was that the company 
recognized the risk that improper quid pro quo arrangements could 
develop in connection with the hospitality program, and that such risks 
were not appropriately managed by the company’s program, including 
through the manner in which they were documented in company 
compliance approval tracking forms. 
. . . . 
 
The case also suggests that programs in the areas of hospitality and 
sponsorship – common and recurring areas of activity for many 
companies – may face enhanced scrutiny for systemic adequacy from a 
regulatory point of view, at least where larger amounts are involved. Such 
a position—if the SEC indeed intends to pursue enforcement actions on 
this basis as a matter of enforcement policy—would significantly expand 
the scope of risks facing US issuers with appreciable FCPA/anti-
corruption risks to their business.116 
Troubling as it was, the BHPB enforcement action was likely not the most 
controversial SEC corporate enforcement action of 2015. That distinction likely 
belongs to the BNY Mellon enforcement action in which the company agreed to pay 
                                                          
 115 Andrew M. Levine et al., Internal Controls of Olympic Proportions: BHP Billiton 
Settles SEC Investigation of Olympic Hospitality, FCPA UPDATE, (May 2015), 
http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2015/05/fcpa_update_may_201
5.pdf. 
 116 Lucinda A. Low & Tom Best, Does SEC’s Enforcement Action Against BHP Billiton 
Take the FCPA’s Accounting Provisions Too Far?, STEPTOE, 
http://www.steptoe.com/publications-10482.html (emphasis in original). 
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$14.8 million.117 The enforcement action was based on SEC findings, which the 
company neither admitted nor denied in an administrative cease-and-desist order, 
that BNY Mellon provided “valuable student internships to family members of 
foreign government officials affiliated with a Middle Eastern sovereign wealth 
fund.”118 As stated by the SEC: 
The violations took place during 2010 and 2011, when employees of 
BNY Mellon sought to corruptly influence foreign officials in order to 
retain and win business managing and servicing the assets of a Middle 
Eastern sovereign wealth fund. 
 
These officials sought, and BNY Mellon agreed to provide, valuable 
internships for their family members. BNY Mellon provided the 
internships without following its standard hiring procedures for interns, 
and the interns were not qualified for BNY Mellon’s existing internship 
programs. 
 
BNY Mellon failed to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls around its hiring practices sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurances that its employees were not bribing foreign officials in 
contravention of company policy.119 
Previous SEC FCPA enforcement actions found that companies violated the 
FCPA (albeit merely the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions) 
for making donations to bona fide charitable foundations favored by an alleged 
“foreign official.”120 However, the BNY Mellon enforcement action went a step 
further by finding that the company also violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions.121 In this regard, the key language from the SEC was the following:  “The 
internships were valuable work experience, and the requesting officials derived 
significant personal value in being able to confer this benefit on their family 
members.”122 
Notwithstanding the SEC’s findings that the interns did not meet BNY’s 
Mellon’s supposed “rigorous criteria” for hiring and were not evaluated and hired 
through the company’s “established internship programs,” the following SEC 
findings were notable.123 One of the interns (Intern C) was not paid. As to the other 
two interns, the SEC’s order states that “because Interns A and B had already 
                                                          
 117 BNY Mellon, supra note 35. 
 118 Id. 
 119 In the Matter of Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (Aug. 18, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-75720.pdf (numeration omitted). 
 120 See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Settled Enforcement Action Against Schering-
Plough Corporation for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations (June 9, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18740.htm. 
 121 Issues To Consider From The BNY Mellon Enforcement Action, supra note 39. 
 122 In the Matter of Bank of New York Mellon Corp., supra note 119 (emphasis added). 
 123 Id. 
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graduated from college,” BNY paid the interns “above the normal salary scale for 
BNY Mellon undergraduate interns but below the scale for postgraduate interns.”124  
In other words, the SEC found that BNY Mellon violated the FCPA’s anti-
bribery provisions, not necessarily because of the compensation offered to the 
interns, but rather the SEC found that the interns should never have been interns at 
BNY Mellon in the first place, and because of this—in the words of the SEC—the 
alleged “foreign officials” “derived significant personal value in being able to confer 
this benefit on their family members.”125 
Like the BHPB enforcement action, the BNY Mellon enforcement action also 
generated much critical commentary in the FCPA space. For instance, Jay Darden (a 
recent Assistant Chief of the DOJ’s Fraud Section) stated, “It’s not the U.S. 
government’s job to regulate hiring policy.”126 FCPA practitioners at Debevoise & 
Plimpton rightly noted: 
[T]he government’s investigations in this area face a key threshold legal 
issue under the FCPA:  can providing a job or internship to an official’s 
relative constitute a thing of value to the official him/herself? Can 
offering the purely psychological benefit of helping a child or relative 
land a job give rise to an actionable attempt at bribery? The official does 
not stand to see any personal financial gain from the internship, except in 
the arguable circumstance of reducing the official’s financial obligations 
to a dependent. But the SEC seems to have purposely disclaimed—or at 
least strained—that theory here, given that one of the internships at issue 
was unpaid. The SEC addressed this thorny issue in a single sentence in 
the Order, asserting that “[t]he internships were valuable work experience, 
and the requesting officials derived significant personal value in being 
able to confer this benefit on their family members.” 
. . .  
[The enforcement action highlights an area of frequent criticism of FCPA 
enforcement that] the activity under scrutiny bears a strong similarity to 
what are perceived as common practices in the private sector in which 
firms seek to accommodate client representative requests in order to 
maintain good relations with key decision makers. In this way, 
enforcement authorities risk criticism that they are using the FCPA to 
excise business practices affecting relationships with foreign officials 
abroad that are routinely tolerated in the private sector in the United 
States—and that are not unprecedented or even rare in the context of 
companies’ relationships with officials employed by the United States 
federal, state, and local governments.127 
                                                          
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Jacob Batchelor, SEC Strikes Series Of FCPA Firsts With BNY Mellon Deal, LAW360 
(Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.law360.com/banking/articles/692484/sec-strikes-series-of-fcpa-
firsts-with-bny-mellon-deal. 
 127 Sean Hecker et al., The SEC Announces First FCPA Enforcement Action Based on 
Allegedly Improper Hiring or Relatives of Foreign Officials, FCPA UPDATE (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2015/08/fcpa_update_august_2
015.pdf. For additional reading on how the BNY Mellon and related FCPA inquiries of the 
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The expansive and evolving enforcement theories that largely defined SEC 
FCPA enforcement in 2015 were presumably further to the SEC’s goal of enforcing 
the FCPA to its “fullest extent”—a term used by SEC Director of Enforcement 
Andrew Ceresney in a November 2015 FCPA speech.128 While acknowledging 
certain criticism of the BNY Mellon enforcement action—the SEC’s first internship 
action against a financial institution that is expected to be a template for future 
enforcement action against similar companies—Ceresney nevertheless stated: 
I would suggest that there was ample basis for viewing the internships as 
something of value to the foreign officials who requested them for their 
relatives, and for concluding that they were given in an attempt to 
influence the foreign officials in connection with the performance of their 
official duties or to obtain an improper advantage from the foreign 
officials. 
 
As I’ve said before, bribes come in many shapes and sizes. And in my 
view, the FCPA is properly read to cover providing valuable favors to a 
foreign official, as well as providing cash, tangible gifts, travel or 
entertainment.129 
The question nevertheless arises:  just what is the fullest extent of the FCPA? 
And in the minds of whom, recognizing that all of the above highlighted 
enforcement actions were resolved in the absence of any judicial scrutiny and in the 
context of the SEC exercising its leverage against risk averse business organizations 
allowed to resolve the actions without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings?130 
Indeed, commenting generally on the SEC’s evolving and expansive FCPA 
enforcement theories, Richard Grime (the former Assistant Director of SEC 
Enforcement) stated: 
It’s not that you couldn’t intellectually [conceive of] the violation. It’s 
that the government is sort of probing every area where there is an 
interaction with government officials and then working backwards from 
there to see if there is a violation, as opposed to starting out with the 
statute . . . and what it prohibits.131 
Compliance professionals advising business organizations on FCPA compliance 
do not have the pleasure of working backwards, but must anticipate FCPA risks on a 
pro-active basis. Thus, regardless of the validity or legitimacy of the recent 
expansive and evolving FCPA enforcement theories, business organizations would 
be wise to heed the words of the enforcement agencies which possess the sticks. In 
                                                                                                                                         
financial services industry highlight a double standard, see Koehler, The Uncomfortable 
Truths, supra note 105. 
 128 Ceresney, Keynote Address, supra note 84. 
 129 Id. 
 130 See Melissa Maleske, The FCPA Predictions GCs Can't Afford To Ignore, LAW360 
(Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.law360.com/whitecollar/articles/635068?nl_pk=571fe56c-690f-
457e-b151-
102a5685d9eb&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=whitecollar. 
 131 Id. (alterations in original). 
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this regard, Ceresney did offer the following guidance in his speech regarding “less 
traditional items of value.”132 Relevant questions that compliance personnel should 
ask include: 
 
• Was the gift, donation, favor, or hiring asked for by the foreign official? 
• Did the company official believe that the gift, donation, favor, or hiring 
would advance their business interests and help them obtain particular 
business, or at least obtain an improper advantage with the foreign official?  
• Was the gift, donation, favor, or hiring consistent with company policy and 
practice?  
• Were the company’s normal procedures followed in connection with the gift, 
donation, favor, or hiring? 
• Would the gift, donation, favor, or hiring have been made if there were no 
potential business benefit?133 
 
 Returning to the absurdity of the absolutist “just don’t bribe” position discussed 
at the beginning of this section, the expansive enforcement theories in 2015 
concerning “things of value” demonstrate once again why the meaning of the 
FCPA’s key “foreign official” element matters.134 To some, the meaning of “foreign 
official” matters only to those intent on engaging in bribery.135 However, the proper 
scope and meaning of the “foreign official” is an issue of extraordinary practical 
significance to businesses and individuals subject to the FCPA. Not because business 
organizations want to bribe, but because business organizations competing in good 
faith in the global marketplace want to engage in conduct, such as offering 
internships or providing entertainment, that is legal and socially acceptable in most 
other situations.136 
 Despite the significance of the meaning of “foreign official” and notwithstanding 
the first judicial decision of precedent in 2014 concerning the contours of the term, 
much remains foggy about this key FCPA element.137 For instance, in 2015, 
consistent with prior years, 55% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, 
in whole or in part, employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled entities 
(SOEs).138 Such entities ranged from health care providers, to sovereign wealth 
                                                          
 132 Ceresney, Keynote Address, supra note 85. 
 133 Id. 
 134 See id. 
 135 Doug Cornelius, What is an “Instrumentality” Under the FCPA?, COMPLIANCE 
BUILDING (May 21, 2014), http://www.compliancebuilding.com/2014/05/21/what-is-an-
instrumentality-under-the-fcpa/. 
 136 Why the Meaning of “Foreign Official” Matters, FCPA PROFESSOR (Nov. 2, 2016), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/meaning-foreign-official-matters-2/. 
 137 To learn more about this decision, United States v. Esquenazi (regarding the question of 
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funds, to a real estate development firm, a sugar factory, a cement company, a 
diamond mine, and an oil and gas company.139 
Moreover, the meaning of “foreign official” was further expanded in a 2015 DOJ 
individual enforcement action alleging that a Maryland resident (Vadim Mikerin), 
working for a Maryland corporation (TENAM Corporation), was a Russian "foreign 
official.”140 The reason, according to the DOJ, was because “TENAM was a wholly-
owned subsidiary on TENEX—an entity ‘indirectly owned and controlled by, and 
perform[ing] functions of, the government of the Russian Federation.’”141 
Commenting on the ambiguities inherent in FCPA enforcement, George 
Terwilliger (former DOJ Acting Attorney General) stated: 
It is fundamental to due process that a person of ordinary intelligence 
should be able to read a law and understand what is required or 
prohibited, as the case may be. Many people of great intelligence on both 
sides of an FCPA question debate just such issues . . . . That does not 
produce the fair warning that those subject to the law deserve to have.142 
Specific to the “foreign official” element, Timothy Dickinson (a veteran of the 
FCPA bar) stated, “Ten years ago, I would have been happy to bet anyone a 
doughnut that I could accurately define what a foreign official is. Now, with various 
court definitions and a lack of clarity from the DOJ, I fear I might actually lose my 
doughnut.”143 
B. Judicial Scrutiny of FCPA and Related Enforcement Theories 
Doughnuts of course have a hole, and a hole in the DOJ’s modern FCPA 
enforcement program has been its struggles when put to its burden of proof. In a 
legal system founded on the rule of law, success is best measured when an 
enforcement agency is put to its burden of proof in the context of an adversarial 
system, not when an enforcement agency exercises its leverage to secure corporate 
settlements against risk-averse business organizations through resolution vehicles 
not subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny.144 This section highlights how, 
similar to prior years, the DOJ struggled in 2015 in contested individual FCPA 
enforcement actions. 
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For the first time since its FCPA trial court debacles in 2011 and 2012,145 in 2015 
the DOJ was put to its burden of proof in an FCPA trial by Joseph Sigelman (a 
former executive of PetroTiger who was criminally charged with, among other 
things, making improper payments to alleged Colombian officials).146 Unlike his co-
defendants, Sigelman exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial, and the case 
was expected to shine light on the DOJ’s expansive “foreign official” theory given 
that Sigelman was expected to call witnesses—including Colombian judges—to 
testify that the officials Sigelman allegedly bribed were not “foreign officials” 
because they did not work for a company that performed government functions.147  
The DOJ’s case against Sigelman relied extensively on his former lawyer, 
Gregory Weisman (a cooperating co-defendant who pleaded guilty in connection 
with the same alleged scheme), who was expected to implicate Sigelman.148 
Evidence in the case was to include secretly recorded conversations with 
Sigelman.149 However, early in the trial the DOJ’s case imploded when Weisman 
acknowledged giving false testimony during the trial, which prompted the presiding 
judge to ask Weisman, “[D]id you have a hallucination?”150 
The trial quickly adjourned as the DOJ contemplated what to do, recognizing of 
course, that the DOJ can control if it is ultimately put to its burden of proof by 
pulling a case if it feels it will not prevail. In the end, that is what the DOJ did as it 
offered Sigelman a plea agreement to substantially reduced charges and Sigelman 
was not sentenced to any jail time.151 Moreover, at sentencing the judge blasted the 
DOJ’s oft-stated rhetoric about the purported difficulty of prosecuting FCPA cases, 
which notably in the Sigelman case originated from a corporate voluntary 
disclosure.152 
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If your only source of FCPA information were the DOJ, you would be in the dark 
about the above dynamics from the Sigelman trial because the DOJ’s press release 
announcing Sigelman’s plea did not mention them.153 However, less biased and more 
sophisticated observers recognized full well that the DOJ had suffered yet another 
FCPA trial court debacle. For instance, Paul Calli, a lawyer who previously 
prevailed on behalf of a client in an FCPA trial, stated: 
Make no mistake: this is a loss for the government and a win for Mr. 
Sigelman. 
. . . . 
 
[The DOJ’s press release is not only] silly [but] it is also offensive to the 
spirit of justice. The release is written as though all the things that went 
badly at trial for DOJ never happened. It fails to mention the lies of the 
cooperator whom the government had decided to embrace. In doing so, it 
is a clear demonstration that the DOJ press office does not exist to inform 
the public, but to serve as the propaganda arm of DOJ.154 
Likewise, FCPA practitioners at Miller Chevalier stated: 
 
The DOJ’s prosecution and trial of Joseph Sigelman deserves special 
notice, as it was the DOJ’s first trial of an individual on FCPA charges 
since the acquittal in January 2012 of John Joseph O’Shea. Sigelman’s 
trial . . . lasted nine days and ended with prosecutors entering into a 
negotiated guilty plea with Sigelman on only one of the six counts with 
which he was charged after a key government witness admitted to lying 
on the stand. Sigelman’s sentence of probation with no imprisonment was 
essentially a victory for Sigelman, and the judge was particularly critical 
of the government’s key witness as well as its sentencing 
recommendation. The trial adds to a string of recent FCPA prosecutions 
involving individuals in which the government has failed to secure a 
conviction or its recommended sentence, highlighting the difficulties the 
DOJ has sometimes encountered when forced to bear its burden of proof 
in court.155 
The DOJ further stumbled in 2015 when a judge substantially trimmed its 
criminal charges against Lawrence Hoskins, a foreign national criminally charged 
for allegedly authorizing improper payments to alleged Indonesian officials.156 
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Unlike his co-defendants who pleaded guilty, Hoskins elected to put the DOJ to its 
burden of proof and in pre-trial briefing argued that the indictment charged “a legally 
invalid theory” by suggesting that he “could be criminally liable for conspiracy to 
violate the FCPA even if the evidence [did] not establish that he was subject to 
criminal liability as a principal, by being an ‘agent’ of a ‘domestic concern.’”157 The 
issue as stated by the court was: 
whether a nonresident foreign national could be subject to criminal 
liability under the FCPA, even where he is not an agent of a domestic 
concern and does not commit acts while physically present in the territory 
of the United States, under a theory of conspiracy or aiding and abetting a 
violation of the FCPA by a person who is within the statute’s reach.158 
The court held, “Based on the text and structure of the FCPA and the legislative 
history accompanying its enactment and its amendment . . . that Congress did not 
intend to impose accomplice liability on non-resident foreign nationals who were not 
subject to direct liability.”159 
FCPA practitioners at King & Spalding rightly observed the following regarding 
the DOJ’s setback in Hoskins: 
[T]he Government argued for an accomplice theory, consistent with the 
Resource Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. . . . The District 
Court rejected that theory, based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gebardi v. United States, which established that whenever Congress has 
intentionally excluded certain individuals from liability for a specific law, 
this congressional intent must not be circumvented by prosecuting such 
individuals based on accomplice liability. While the District Court 
rejected accomplice liability as an additional basis for FCPA jurisdiction, 
it remains to be seen how other courts will address this question, and 
whether the DOJ and the SEC will revisit their guidance on the matter. 
Given the rarity of written judicial opinions interpreting the FCPA, this 
ruling is likely to have an outsized impact on future FCPA enforcement 
actions.160 
The Sigelman and Hoskins matters were not the only notable DOJ enforcement 
actions in 2015 in which the DOJ struggled. Two other cases from 2015 relevant to 
FCPA enforcement were also noteworthy. 
In United States v. Vassilieve, the DOJ criminally charged two foreign nationals 
for allegedly providing money and other things of value to an executive of the 
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International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a United Nations agency 
responsible for standardizing machine-readable passports.161 The DOJ’s indictment 
did not contain any U.S. jurisdictional allegations, and, likely because of this, the 
bribery scheme was not charged as an FCPA offense.162 Even so, the conduct was in 
the same general space and “the indictment alleged that the U.S. was a member of 
ICAO and provided support to ICAO by, among other things, annual monetary 
contributions.”163 Presumably on the basis of this allegation, the DOJ charged the 
defendants with, among other things, conspiracy to solicit and to give bribes 
involving a federal program, soliciting bribes involving a federal program, and 
giving bribes involving a federal program.164 
The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment and argued it was “a most 
unusual indictment. It levels charges against foreign nationals and is based solely on 
foreign conduct. The indictment candidly states that the alleged offenses were 
committed in their entirety outside the United States.”165 
The court granted the motion to dismiss and the judge’s comments from the 
bench should be of an interest to anyone interested in extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law. In pertinent part, the judge stated: 
My first reaction in reading this indictment is that your office is to be 
congratulated because, apparently, you have reduced crime in the 
Northern District of California, and indeed in the United States of 
America, to such a point that you are using resources of your office to go 
after criminal activity that occurs in foreign countries and for that—that’s 
a rather interesting concept that, apparently, you thought this is a good use 
of assets and resources of the United States Attorney’s Office for the 
Northern District of California. 
. . . .  
And I never in my life, in 50 years of criminal practice, seen a more 
misguided prosecution as the one that you’ve brought. I just don’t even 
get it. I don’t get it, how you can—how you can use resources of the 
United States Attorney’s Office to prosecute some foreign nationals 
involved in a foreign company, engaged in conduct which was foreign, on 
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doing things that weren’t directly related to the contribution of the United 
States to that entity.166 
The final notable instance of judicial scrutiny—albeit foreign judicial scrutiny—
of DOJ enforcement in 2015 occurred in a high-profile FCPA enforcement action 
against Dmitry Firtash, a wealthy Ukrainian businessman with alleged ties to Russia, 
who was criminally charged along with others in an alleged bribery scheme 
involving Indian officials to secure mining licenses.167 Upon being criminally 
charged by U.S. law enforcement, coincidentally during the same general timeframe 
that U.S. relations with Russia escalated due to a conflict in Ukraine, Firtash stated 
that the charges were “completely absurd and unfounded” and that “it [was] apparent 
that [the action], including the US extradition request, [was] politically 
motivated.”168 The first step in the DOJ’s enforcement action was to seek Firtash’s 
extradition from Austria where he was arrested.169 However, an Austrian judge 
refused the DOJ’s request to extradite Firtash and called the case against him 
“politically motivated” and lacking “sufficient proof.”170 
In short, while the DOJ’s modern FCPA enforcement program has been 
successful in exercising leverage against risk averse business organizations to secure 
settlement amounts through resolution vehicles not subjected to any meaningful 
judicial scrutiny, 2015 again witnessed several DOJ struggles when put to its burden 
of proof in the context of an adversarial system. As noted by FCPA practitioner 
Michael Levy: 
We’ve seen several trials in which the judges have been skeptical, if not 
outwardly hostile, to some of the government’s more aggressive 
interpretations of the FCPA. While those trials may have fallen apart for 
other reasons, that skepticism still played, I believe, a substantial role. 
Without the development of the law through judicial decisions, it’s very 
unclear what judges believe the FCPA means compared to what the DOJ 
think the FCPA means.171 
C. Policy Pronouncements and Developments Relevant to FCPA Issues 
While 2015 DOJ FCPA enforcement was substantially down compared to prior 
years, as highlighted in this section 2015 was nevertheless an active year from the 
standpoint of the DOJ articulating to the corporate community what they think the 
FCPA means or otherwise outlining policy positions relevant to FCPA issues. 
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The year started in a most curious fashion as prior FCPA enforcement critic and 
reform advocate Andrew Weissmann was named head of the DOJ’s Fraud Section.172 
Understanding Weissmann’s previous positions put into clear focus many of the 
DOJ’s policy pronouncements in 2015 relevant to FCPA issues and thus, his 
positions are set forth below in detail. 
In 2010, Weissmann was the lead author of Restoring Balance: Proposed 
Amendments to the FCPA, an advocacy piece written on behalf of the U.S. Chamber 
Institute for Legal Reform.173 Publication of Restoring Balance soon led to a Senate 
FCPA reform hearing in November 2010 and thereafter a House FCPA reform 
hearing in June 2011.174 In Restoring Balance, Weissmann stated: 
In spite of this rise in enforcement and investigatory action, judicial 
oversight and rulings on the meaning of the provisions of the FCPA is still 
minimal. Commercial organizations are rarely positioned to litigate an 
FCPA enforcement action to its conclusion, and the risk of serious jail 
time for individual defendants has led most to seek favorable terms from 
the government rather than face the expense and uncertainty of a trial. 
Thus, the primary statutory interpretive function is still being performed 
almost exclusively by the DOJ Fraud Section and the SEC. Notably, these 
enforcement agencies have been increasingly aggressive in their reading 
of the law. The DOJ has expressed its approach primarily through its 
opinion releases, but also in its decisions as to what FCPA enforcement 
actions to pursue. Many commentators have expressed concern that the 
DOJ effectively serves as both prosecutor and judge in the FCPA context, 
because it both brings FCPA charges and effectively controls the 
disposition of the FCPA cases it initiates.175 
Using phrases such as “how far the DOJ has pressed the limits of enforcement,” 
“DOJ’s aggressive pursuit” of companies as an “indication of how far the DOJ is 
willing to expand the scope of FCPA enforcement,” and “the highly aggressive 
stance the DOJ is taking to expand the FCPA net beyond its borders,”176 Weissmann 
stated: 
The current FCPA enforcement environment has been costly to business. 
Businesses enmeshed in a full-blown FCPA investigation conducted by 
the U.S. government have and will continue to spend enormous sums on 
legal fees, forensic accounting, and other investigative costs before they 
are even confronted with a fine or penalty, which . . . can range into the 
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tens or hundreds of millions. In fact, one noteworthy innovation in FCPA 
enforcement policy has been the effective outsourcing of investigations by 
the government to the private sector, by having companies suspected of 
FCPA violations shoulder the cost of uncovering such violations 
themselves through extensive internal investigations. 
From the government’s standpoint, it is the best of both worlds. The costs 
of investigating FCPA violations are borne by the company and any 
resulting fines or penalties accrue entirely to the government. For 
businesses, this arrangement means having to expend significant sums on 
an investigation based solely on allegations of wrongdoing and, if 
violations are found, without any guarantee that the business will receive 
cooperation credit for conducting an investigation.177 
Elsewhere in Restoring Balance, Weissmann argued: 
[T]he FCPA should be modified to make clear what is and what is not a 
violation. The statute should take into account the realities that confront 
businesses that operate in countries with endemic corruption (e.g., Russia, 
which is consistently ranked by Transparency International as among the 
most corrupt in the world) or in countries where many companies are 
state-owned (e.g., China) and it therefore may not be immediately 
apparent whether an individual is considered a “foreign official” within 
the meaning of the act. As the U.S. government has not prohibited U.S. 
companies from engaging in business in such countries, a company that 
chooses to engage in such business faces unique hurdles. The FCPA 
should incentivize the company to establish compliance systems that will 
actively discourage and detect bribery, but should also permit companies 
that maintain such effective systems to avail themselves of an affirmative 
defense to charges of FCPA violations. This is so because in such 
countries even if companies have strong compliance systems in place, a 
third-party vendor or errant employee may be tempted to engage in acts 
that violate the business’s explicit anti-bribery policies. It is unfair to hold 
a business criminally liable for behavior that was neither sanctioned by or 
known to the business. The imposition of criminal liability in such a 
situation does nothing to further the goals of the FCPA; it merely creates 
the illusion that the problem of bribery is being addressed, while the 
parties that actually engaged in bribery often continue on, undeterred and 
unpunished. The FCPA should instead encourage businesses to be vigilant 
and compliant.  
For this reason, and given the current state of enforcement, the FCPA 
is ripe for much needed clarification and reform through improvements to 
the existing statute. Such improvements, which are best suited for 
Congressional action, are aimed at providing more certainty to the 
business community when trying to comply with the FCPA, while 
promoting efficiency and enhancing public confidence in the integrity of 
the free market system as well as the underlying principles of our criminal 
justice system.178 
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On behalf of the U.S. Chamber, Weissmann also testified at the November 2010 
Senate hearing. In his written testimony, Weissmann stated: 
The FCPA had been tailored to balance various competing interests, but 
that balance has been altered, at times, by aggressive application and 
interpretations of the statute by the government. Instead of serving the 
original intent of the statute, which was to punish companies that 
participate in foreign bribery, actions taken under more expansive 
interpretations of the statute may ultimately punish corporations whose 
connection to improper acts is attenuated at best and nonexistent at worst. 
 
The result is that the FCPA, as it currently written and implemented, 
leaves corporations vulnerable to civil and criminal penalties for a wide 
variety of conduct that is in many cases beyond their control and 
sometimes even their knowledge. It also exposes businesses to predatory 
follow-on civil suits that often get filed in the wake of a FCPA 
enforcement action. In fact, there is reason to believe that the FCPA has 
made U.S. businesses less competitive than their foreign counterparts who 
do not have significant FCPA exposure.179 
In concluding his written testimony, Weissmann stated: 
The recent dramatic increase in FCPA enforcement, coupled with the lack 
of judicial oversight, has created significant uncertainty among the 
American business community about the scope of the statute. In addition, 
some of the enforcement actions brought by the SEC and DOJ are not 
commensurate with the original goals of the FCPA, in that they fail to 
reach the true bad actors and instead assign criminal liability to corporate 
entities with attenuated or non-existent connections to potential FCPA 
violations.180 
During the hearing, Weissmann stated: 
One of the reasons it is important to have a clearer statute, particularly in 
the FCPA arena, is that corporations cannot typically take the risk of 
going to trial and, thus, there is a dearth of legal rulings on the provisions 
of the FCPA as it applies to organizations. Thus, the government’s 
interpretation can be the first and the last word on the scope of the statute 
as it applies to a company. The lack of judicial oversight, expansive 
government interpretation of the FCPA, and the increased enforcement 
that you heard about from [the DOJ witness] have led to considerable 
concern and uncertainty about how and when the FCPA applies to 
overseas business activities.181 
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During the hearing, Senator Arlen Specter asked Weismann: “Overall, do you 
think that the act is fairly well balanced and fairly well enforced or too tough?”182 
Weissmann responded: 
I think there is no question that many of the cases that were brought 
up today, such as Siemens, fall far, far, far into the—that it is amply 
warranted for the application of the statute. The problem is that every 
company in America and many companies overseas worry about the 
statute daily. And so regardless of what the Department of Justice is 
doing, people think about the statute and could their conduct fall on one 
side of it versus the other and will they be subject to an investigation. So 
it is a difficult question to answer, because I have seen many prosecutions 
where you say, of course, that seems like a just result and should have 
been warranted, but there are many companies that are hurt by the 
ambiguities in the statute and what I think is the over-breadth of some of 
its provisions on a daily basis.183 
Beyond the FCPA, Weissmann has also been a vocal advocate of reforming 
corporate criminal liability principles. In Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 
Weissmann challenged traditional notions of corporate criminal liability and argued 
that when the DOJ seeks to charge a corporation as a defendant, the government 
should bear the burden of establishing as an additional element that the corporation 
failed to have reasonably effective policies and procedures to prevent the conduct.184 
When Weissmann became the head of the DOJ’s Fraud Section in January 2015, 
some were dismissive of his previous FCPA positions and comments. For instance, 
in connection with her Senate confirmation, then Attorney General Nominee Loretta 
Lynch was specifically asked about Weissmann being “an outspoken critic of DOJ’s 
FCPA program.”185 Lynch stated, “It is my understanding that Mr. Weissmann made 
these comments while in private practice and in connection with his representation 
of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform.”186 Lynch’s response was a dodge 
and conveniently ignored that Weissmann, in his personal capacity, challenged 
traditional notions of corporate criminal liability.187 Moreover, public reports 
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suggested that “a person familiar with Weissmann’s thinking said he viewed most of 
his [FCPA] congressional testimony as giving his personal views rather than doing 
work for a client.”188 
At the very least, Weissmann’s previous FCPA comments shine a light on a 
reoccurring issue, involving individuals like Weissmann who move in and out of 
government service, of whether any genuine or legitimate beliefs are being 
articulated by people who are willing to be held accountable.  
As Weissmann correctly noted during his Senate FCPA testimony, a hallmark of 
modern FCPA inquiries is business organizations often spending “enormous sums on 
legal fees, forensic accounting, and other investigative costs before they are even 
confronted with a fine or penalty, which . . . can range into the tens or hundreds of 
millions.”189 Indeed, as highlighted by the below examples, pre-enforcement action 
professional fees and expenses typically exceed, often by a wide margin, settlement 
amounts in an FCPA enforcement action.190 
For instance, Avon resolved an FCPA enforcement action concerning alleged 
conduct in China by agreeing to a $135 million settlement.191 Yet, the most notable 
aspect of Avon’s FCPA scrutiny was the approximate $500 million the company 
spent on pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses.192 The DOJ’s 
resolution document contained the following unusual statement: 
The Department also considered that the Company, taking into account its 
own business interests, expended considerable resources on a company 
wide review of and enhancements to its compliance program and internal 
controls. While the Company’s efforts in this regard were taken without 
Department request or guidance, and at times caused unintended delays in 
the progress of the Department’s narrower investigations, the Department 
recognizes that the Company’s efforts resulted in important compliance 
and internal controls improvements.193 
Avon’s ratio of pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses to settlement 
amount paled in comparison to the ratio in connection with the FCPA scrutiny of 
Hyperdynamics. Specifically, the company resolved an FCPA enforcement action 
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concerning alleged conduct in Guinea by agreeing to a $75,000 settlement.194 Yet, 
the company’s annual report stated that it incurred $12.7 million in “legal and other 
professional fees associated with the FCPA investigations”—an astonishing 170:1 
ratio.195 During an investor conference call shortly after resolution of the 
enforcement action, company executives stated:  
Speaking of legal fees I do want to address the fees we incurred during 
the FCPA investigation. As you know, we spent $12 MM from inception 
to closure of that investigation. We were unhappily aware that FCPA 
investigations can take years to conclude . . . This came at a very heavy 
legal cost to say the least.196 
Hyperdynamics executives (and shareholders) should be unhappy and should ask 
some serious questions because, in the eyes of many, pre-enforcement action 
professional fees and expenses have spiraled out of control, and FCPA scrutiny often 
becomes a boondoggle for FCPA Inc. participants involved in a matter.197 
Against this backdrop, Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell delivered a 
2015 speech in which she made the following notable observation: 
All too often, criticism is leveled against the Justice Department for 
purportedly causing companies to spend years, and many millions of 
dollars, investigating potential violations. This is particularly true in the 
FCPA context where the need for international evidence can add to the 
expense and burden of an investigation. Critics wrongly question the 
wisdom of disclosing misconduct and cooperating with the government in 
light of what they perceive to be the department’s requirement that 
companies then must conduct unnecessarily costly, time consuming and 
widespread investigations. 
 
There is no question that some cooperating companies spend large sums 
of money investigating potential misconduct and correcting internal 
controls issues that allowed the misconduct to occur. The decision to 
incur those costs, however, is one made by those companies, not a 
requirement of the department. When a company chooses to cooperate 
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with the government, the manner in which the company approaches its 
cooperation, and its own investigation of the conduct, can significantly 
affect the length of the investigation and the costs incurred by the 
company. 
 
Although we expect internal investigations to be thorough, we do not 
expect companies to aimlessly boil the ocean. Indeed, there have been 
some instances in which companies have, in our view, conducted overly 
broad and needlessly costly investigations, in some cases delaying our 
ability to resolve matters in a timely fashion. 
 
For example, if a company discovers an FCPA violation in one country, 
and has no basis to suspect that violations are occurring elsewhere, we 
would not necessarily expect it to extend its investigation beyond the 
conduct in that country. On the other hand, if the same people involved in 
the violation also operated in other countries, we likely would expect the 
investigation to be broader. 
 
This example is not intended to suggest the proper scope of an 
investigation of any given matter. My point instead is that, to receive 
cooperation credit, we expect companies to conduct appropriately tailored 
investigations designed to root out misconduct, identify wrongdoers and 
provide all available facts. To the extent a company decides to conduct a 
broader survey of its operations, that decision, and any attendant delay 
and cost, are the result of the company’s choices, not the department’s 
requirement.198 
Caldwell’s statement about pre-enforcement action professional fees and 
expenses, a sensitive topic because it implicitly calls into question the decisions and 
motivations of FCPA Inc. participants, set off a war-of-words in the FCPA space. 
For instance, “defense attorneys . . . balked at the idea that they’re spending too 
much time or money on investigations they’re conducting in large part for the 
government’s sake, saying they’re not willfully adding unnecessary work to an 
FCPA probe.”199  
Most notably, Paul Pelletier (former Principal Deputy Chief of the Criminal 
Division’s Fraud Section) stated: 
Somewhat surprisingly . . . Caldwell seemed to place the blame for the 
arduousness of government FCPA investigations squarely on companies 
for “spend[ing] years, and many millions of dollars, investigating 
potential violations. . . . As an initial observation, it remains an 
unavoidable fact that companies simply are not incentivized to incur 
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substantial costs by acting needlessly in the conduct of those internal 
inquiries. Moreover, while it may be true that, on occasion, a company 
has “boiled the ocean” in the conduct of an internal investigation, the 
notion that federal investigators would routinely permit an “aimless” 
internal inquiry to negatively affect the course or duration of the 
government’s investigation is, at base, unconvincing.200 
Caldwell quickly shot-back when asked about companies that “wrack up massive 
legal bills and do massive worldwide investigations” by saying, “That’s not us. 
That’s the companies.”201 Regardless of who is at fault for the extent of pre-
enforcement action professional fees and expenses in a typical instance of FCPA 
scrutiny, the fact remains that such expenses are often the most serious hit to the 
bottom-line of a company under FCPA scrutiny.202  
As Assistant Attorney General Caldwell rightly recognized, the time it takes to 
resolve FCPA scrutiny is often intertwined with the expense of FCPA scrutiny. 
Legal scrutiny—whether in the FCPA context or otherwise—is a cloud hanging over 
a business organization. When the legal scrutiny can result in potential criminal 
liability, the cloud is black or at the very least gray. For many companies, the cloud 
of FCPA scrutiny simply lasts too long.203 Indeed, the alleged conduct in many 
corporate enforcement actions occurred 5-7 years, 7-10 years, and in some instances, 
10-15 years prior to the enforcement action.204 What makes this dynamic particularly 
troubling is that even the DOJ has long voiced concerns about protracted 
investigations. For instance, in 2005 then DOJ Assistant Attorney General 
Christopher Wray stated, “Simply put, speed matters in corporate fraud 
investigations. The days of five-year investigations, of agreement after agreement 
tolling the statute of limitations—while ill-gotten gains are frittered away and 
investor confidence sinks—are increasingly a thing of the past.”205 
The gray cloud of scrutiny most certainly is not a thing of the past and in 2015 
needed attention was focused on this troubling aspect of FCPA enforcement. As 
                                                          
 200 Paul E. Pelletier, Getting Real: FCPA Investigations Shouldn’t ‘Boil the Ocean’, FCPA 
BLOG (May 11, 2015, 9:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/5/11/getting-real-fcpa-
investigations-shouldnt-boil-the-ocean.html. 
 201 Joel Schectman, DOJ Wants Faster Anti-Bribery Investigations, Too, WALL ST. J. (May 
19, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/05/19/doj-wants-faster-anti-bribery-
investigations-too/. 
 202 See Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-152/. 
 203 See The Gray Cloud of FCPA Scrutiny Simply Lasts Too Long, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 
9, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-gray-cloud-of-fcpa-scrutiny-simply-lasts-too-long 
(containing discussion of specific examples). 
 204 Id. 
 205 Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Div., Remarks to the ABA 
White Collar Crime Luncheon (Feb. 25, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1031/INVN04-
01/2005628_r17d_04CV3181.pdf).  
37Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017
194 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:157 
 
often is the case, a vocal critic was a former senior DOJ official.206 In a Wall Street 
Journal editorial titled “The Foreign Bribery Sinkhole at Justice,” Pelletier wrote: 
Absurdly long and costly investigations . . . may cause companies to 
reassess the value of reporting FCPA violations to the federal 
government. 
 
When bribery investigations are publicly resolved in a timely fashion, 
other businesses can more readily identify ongoing bribery schemes 
operating within their industry or region and ensure that their anti-bribery 
compliance programs adequately address those current schemes. That 
opportunity is lost when criminal resolutions drag out for five or more 
years. Deterrence then is principally the size of the monetary penalty. 
 
The Justice Department needs to do more than churn out resolutions to 
foreign bribery cases notable only for their record-breaking penalties. 
Rigorous and prompt FCPA enforcement can have a dramatic impact on 
the insidious and corrosive effect of corruption overseas and provide . . . 
restorative justice.207 
Given Pelletier’s former DOJ position, his insight on this issue is notable and is 
thus set forth below in more detail. In a follow-up article, Pelletier further observed: 
[T]he pattern of costly delay in FCPA investigations continues unabated.  
While every government investigation and resolution poses unique facts 
and circumstances that may serve to delay the investigatory process, these 
recent long-developing FCPA resolutions . . . are convincingly 
problematic.  The staggering investigative costs, ultimately borne by 
employees and shareholders alike . . . also can reach unconscionable 
levels.208 
Countering the DOJ’s assertion that the delay in many FCPA investigations is 
due to the complexity of obtaining foreign evidence, Pelletier argued: 
[This explanation] fails to explain the more than twofold increase in 
investigatory durations from historical norms.  A dispassionate, 
experience-based analysis of this overly broad assertion exposes a faulty 
premise.  Simply put, the DOJ can and must do better. 
. . . . 
With a cooperating corporation, FCPA investigators routinely find 
themselves in the unique position of having prompt access to overseas 
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evidence and witnesses without a need to resort to cumbersome 
international treaty requests. Such cooperation is much like the 
prosecution having secured a cooperator with unfettered access to the 
critical evidence. 
. . . . 
Regardless of the reason or reasons for these protracted investigations, 
both the continued vitality of the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement efforts and 
the prominence of the United States as the global leader of anti-corruption 
enforcement would seem to demand a renewed effort to dramatically 
reduce the time frame necessary to achieve resolution.209 
Pelletier next rightly highlighted the many benefits of prompt law enforcement. 
Legitimate enterprises benefit from those kinds of real-time 
revelations, and criminal political regimes can be immediately identified 
and deterred.  Moreover, when a criminal resolution discloses and 
punishes criminal conduct that occurred five or more years earlier, any 
deterrent effect of the resolution is significantly diminished. This is 
particularly true in industries where the overseas corrupt conduct 
flourishes with abandon. 
 
At that late stage, the principal deterrent effect is relegated to the size 
of the monetary penalty—something the DOJ continues to emphasize 
with all too much frequency and relish. As recent cases have 
demonstrated, lengthy FCPA investigations also place untenably wasteful 
financial burdens on corporations, their employees and their shareholders. 
 
Given that the DOJ’s FCPA unit within the Fraud Section has more 
than doubled in size from 2009 to today and has been fortified by a 
dedicated squad of FBI agents, it is puzzling that many of these 
investigations seem to drag on interminably. The DOJ must strive to be 
more than just “FCPA Inc.,” churning out stale resolutions notable only 
for their record-breaking penalties.210 
In conclusion, Pelletier stated: 
The interests of justice are neither served nor advanced when FCPA 
investigations routinely drag on for five or more years. Rigorous and 
prompt FCPA enforcement with respect to current bribery schemes can 
have a dramatic impact on the insidious and corrosive effect of corruption 
overseas.   
. . . . 
Curing the deficiencies that lead to costly and wasteful delays will require 
a systemic and sustained effort, primarily by the DOJ. It will also require 
a more focused approach by outside counsel. Although the ameliorative 
benefits resulting from such change will not be achieved overnight, the 
long-term vitality and efficacy of the DOJ’s anti-corruption enforcement 
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efforts ultimately rests on the government’s ability to sustainably alter the 
status quo.211 
In short, the gray cloud of FCPA scrutiny simply lasts too long in the FCPA’s 
modern era and results in a host of problematic policy issues as highlighted above.212 
Like several other problematic issues that define the FCPA’s modern era, blame for 
the gray cloud is shared by the enforcement agencies as well as business 
organizations subject to FCPA scrutiny (and their counsel). Simply put, cooperation 
is often the name-of-the-game in most FCPA enforcement actions and the roll-over-
and-play-dead mentality of most companies,213 which results in waiver of statute of 
limitation defenses or execution of tolling agreements, has broad policy 
consequences.214 If business organizations would actually mount bona fide legal 
defenses in the face of FCPA scrutiny the FCPA’s modern era, including the 
troubling gray cloud of scrutiny, would look much different.215  
Yet, the government also shares in the blame. As stated by Pelletier: 
From 2002 through 2010, the average Criminal Division tenure of a Fraud 
Section prosecutor exceeded 5 years and . . . during that same time frame, 
the average duration of a foreign bribery investigation measured from the 
last act of the offense to resolution was approximately 3 years. 
Commentators have noted an increasingly high and troubling turnover 
rate in the Fraud Section since 2010, radically altering the average tenure 
of Section prosecutors. Moreover, since 2010 the average investigatory 
duration of foreign bribery matters has doubled to more than six years. 
 
Whatever explanation may be offered for these jaw dropping statistics, the 
practical effect is that most FCPA investigations will be passed from 
prosecutor to prosecutor, almost certainly leading to unnecessarily 
protracted investigations.216 
A final 2015 policy pronouncement relevant to FCPA enforcement was the 
announcement of a new “compliance counsel” at the DOJ.217 In terms of background, 
a frequent criticism of the modern FCPA enforcement program is that the DOJ (and 
SEC) fail to give proper credit to a company’s good faith efforts to comply with the 
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FCPA when a single employee or small group of actors engage in conduct contrary 
to the company’s pre-existing FCPA compliance policies and procedures.218 In such 
situations, the enforcement agencies often hold the company liable for FCPA 
violations based on respondeat superior principles in what amounts to strict 
liability.219 
This aspect of FCPA enforcement was a major topic in both the Senate’s 2010 
FCPA hearing as well as the House’s 2011 FCPA hearing.220 Against the backdrop 
of several former high-ranking DOJ officials (including Weissmann) supporting an 
FCPA compliance defense (a defense consistent with the FCPA-like laws of many 
peer nations), the DOJ has remained defiant in its opposition to the concept, calling a 
compliance defense, among other things, “novel and . . . risky” and that “the time is 
not right” to consider it.221 In pertinent part, the DOJ has long maintained that an 
actual FCPA statutory amendment setting forth a compliance defense is not 
necessary because the DOJ already declines to prosecute business organizations for 
FCPA violations under respondeat superior principles when, among other reasons, 
the organization had pre-existing compliance policies and procedures, only a rogue 
employee was involved in the improper conduct, or the improper conduct was 
limited in scope.222 
Accepting the DOJ’s statement as true, the fact remains that DOJ consideration 
of pre-existing FCPA compliance policies and procedures is opaque, unpredictable, 
and, in the minds of many, inconsistent.223 An actual FCPA compliance defense 
would accomplish, among other things, the policy goal of removing factors relevant 
to corporate criminal liability from the opaque, inconsistent, and unpredictable world 
of DOJ decision making towards a more transparent, consistent, and predictable 
model.224 Indeed, as Weissmann previously stated, improvements to the FCPA, 
including a compliance defense, “are best suited for Congressional action.”225  
Presumably Weissmann encountered substantial political opposition to an actual 
compliance defense along the lines he previously advocated for because, in the 
minds of some, an FCPA compliance defense weakens the FCPA and creates a “race 
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to the bottom.”226 Such criticism of course ignores both the fact that most peer 
nations with FCPA-like laws have compliance defense concepts in their laws and the 
many positive policy objectives that can be accomplished with a compliance 
defense. Indeed, as Weissmann previously stated, the FCPA “should incentivize the 
company to establish compliance systems that will actively discourage and detect 
bribery.”227 
Compliance is a cost center within business organizations and expenditure of 
finite resources on FCPA compliance is an investment best sold if it can reduce legal 
exposure, not merely lessen the impact of legal exposure.228 Moreover, at present, the 
incentives organizations have to adopt FCPA compliance policies and procedures 
solely are to lessen the impact of legal exposure. These present incentives thus 
represent “baby carrots” when what is needed to better incentivize more robust 
FCPA compliance are real “carrots.” An FCPA compliance defense is a real “carrot” 
that will better incentivize compliance across the business landscape. Organizations 
with existing FCPA compliance policies and procedures will be incentivized to make 
existing programs better. Likewise, organizations currently without stand-alone 
FCPA policies and procedures will be incentivized to spend finite resources to 
implement FCPA compliance policies and procedures.229 
Against this relevant backdrop and the policy discussion surrounding an FCPA 
compliance defense, in late 2015 the DOJ announced: 
[T]he Department of Justice Fraud Section has retained Hui Chen as a 
full-time compliance expert. She will report to Andrew Weissmann, the 
Chief of the Fraud Section . . .  
 
Among her duties as a consulting expert, Chen will provide expert 
guidance to Fraud Section prosecutors as they consider the enumerated 
factors in the United States Attorneys’ Manual concerning the prosecution 
of business entities, including the existence and effectiveness of any 
compliance program that a company had in place at the time of the 
conduct giving rise to the prospect of criminal charges, and whether the 
corporation has taken meaningful remedial action, such as the 
implementation of new compliance measures to detect and prevent future 
wrongdoing. Chen will help prosecutors develop appropriate benchmarks 
for evaluating corporate compliance and remediation measures and 
communicating with stakeholders in setting those benchmarks. Relatedly, 
after a corporate resolution is reached requiring ongoing Fraud Section 
assessments of a company’s compliance and remediation efforts, Chen 
will provide expert guidance to help prosecutors and monitors evaluate 
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whether the implementation of such measures is effective and in keeping 
with the terms and purposes of Fraud Section resolutions.230 
At the same time, Assistant Attorney General Caldwell delivered a speech in 
which she rhetorically asked, “What will the compliance counsel do?”231 and offered 
the following:  
She will help us evaluate each compliance program on a case-by-case 
basis—just as the department always has—but with a more expert eye, 
and she will work with our prosecutors to assess: 
 
• Does the institution ensure that its directors and senior managers 
provide strong, explicit and visible support for its corporate 
compliance policies? 
• Do the people who are responsible for compliance have stature 
within the company? Do compliance teams get adequate funding 
and access to necessary resources? Of course, we won’t expect 
that a smaller company has the same compliance resources as a 
Fortune-50 company. 
• Are the institution’s compliance policies clear and in writing? 
Are they easily understood by employees? Are the policies 
translated into languages spoken by the company’s employees? 
• Does the institution ensure that its compliance policies are 
effectively communicated to all employees? Are its written 
policies easy for employees to find? Do employees have repeated 
training, which should include direction regarding what to do or 
with whom to consult when issues arise? 
• Does the institution review its policies and practices to keep 
them up to date with evolving risks and circumstances? This is 
especially important if a U.S.-based entity acquires or merges 
with another business, especially a foreign one. 
• Are there mechanisms to enforce compliance policies? Those 
include both incentivizing good compliance and disciplining 
violations.  Is discipline even handed? The department does not 
look favorably on situations in which low-level employees who 
may have engaged in misconduct are terminated, but the more 
senior people who either directed or deliberately turned a blind 
eye to the conduct suffer no consequences. Such action sends the 
wrong message—to other employees, to the market and to the 
government—about the institution’s commitment to compliance. 
• Does the institution sensitize third parties like vendors, agents or 
consultants to the company’s expectation that its partners are 
also serious about compliance? This means more than including 
                                                          
 230 Press Release, DOJ, New Compliance Counsel Expert Retained By the DOJ Fraud 
Section (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download. 
 231 Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. 
Caldwell Speaks at SIFMA Compliance and Legal Soc’y N.Y. Reg’l Seminar (Nov. 2, 2015) 
(transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-
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boilerplate language in a contract. It means taking action—
including termination of a business relationship—if a partner 
demonstrates a lack of respect for laws and policies. And that 
attitude toward partner compliance must exist regardless of 
geographic location.232 
To knowledgeable observers, Caldwell’s speech was nothing new. As Professor 
Samuel Buell (a former DOJ prosecutor) stated: 
So why does the Department of Justice need to appoint a special lawyer to 
do the job of assessing what prosecutors have long assessed, especially 
when that lawyer will be exercising the same broad discretion, with no 
governing law, that federal prosecutors have been exercising up to now? 
Will this lawyer have some particular expertise in the connection between 
crime and corporate compliance efforts that other prosecutors have 
lacked? If so, where will this expertise come from? It’s hard to see how 
adding another person to the process of exercising existing discretion in 
this area is really going to change the landscape much.233 
Indeed, rather than support Weissmann’s (and others) call for an FCPA 
compliance defense and more broad revisions to corporate criminal liability, the 
DOJ’s announcement of a compliance counsel position appears to be little more than 
a public relations campaign that masks the underlying substantive issues. 
As FCPA practitioner Derek Andreson rightly observed, “It’s a clever move 
because it avoids the Justice Department having to confront a formal compliance 
defense, which I think can be seen as giving bad incentives. And it gives them a 
chance to push back on the criticism that they don’t place enough weight on 
compliance efforts.”234 
Even FCPA commentators that normally tilt towards DOJ positions were critical 
of the compliance counsel position. For instance, FCPA practitioner Michael Volkov 
(a former DOJ prosecutor) stated: 
To suggest that [the DOJ] need[s] some assistance is just a little too 
politically cute for me. As a former federal prosecutor, I am not so sure 
that the position was really needed. In my mind, career prosecutors at the 
Department and in US Attorneys’ Offices across the country are quite 
familiar with these issues already and there does not seem to be a real 
need for such compliance assistance. Federal prosecutors have more than 
enough expertise in this area, and to suggest otherwise is a slap at the 
professionalism and care that prosecutors bring to their jobs.235 
DOJ motivations aside, the new compliance counsel position was just one of 
several notable DOJ policy pronouncements relevant to the FCPA discussed in this 
                                                          
 232 Id. 
 233 Corporate Compliance Counsel Draws Mixed Reviews, supra note 217.  
 234 Joel Schectman, Compliance Counsel to Help DOJ Decide Whom to Prosecute, WALL 
ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (July 30, 2015), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/07/30/compliance-counsel-to-help-doj-decide-
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 235 Corporate Compliance Counsel Draws Mixed Reviews, supra note 217.  
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section. In short, 2015 was an interesting year from a policy perspective as FCPA 
enforcement critic and reform advocate Weissmann assumed the head of the DOJ’s 
Fraud Section. 
D. Developments Beyond the FCPA 
As highlighted above, 2015 was notable for its expansive and evolving FCPA 
enforcement theories, judicial scrutiny of FCPA and related enforcement theories, 
and policy pronouncements and developments relevant to FCPA issues. As 
discussed in this section, 2015 also witnessed several notable developments beyond 
the FCPA that nevertheless touch upon FCPA issues or are otherwise relevant to a 
similar space. 
1. FCPA-Related Civil Litigation 
Although courts have held that the FCPA does not provide a private right of 
action,236 plaintiff lawyers representing shareholders frequently use instances of 
FCPA scrutiny or the core facts from FCPA enforcement actions in civil suits.237 
Many of these cases are derivative actions in which a shareholder claims that officers 
and directors breached fiduciary duties by allegedly allowing the company to operate 
without sufficient FCPA compliance policies or procedures and/or not properly 
monitoring and supervising those policies and procedures in place.238   
A notable instance of FCPA scrutiny in recent years has involved Wal-Mart,239 
and in connection with the company’s FCPA scrutiny, civil suits began to rain down 
on the company and its current or former executive officers and board members.240 
Several of the civil suits were consolidated, and as summarized by the court, plaintiff 
shareholders alleged that various individual defendants “breached their fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and good faith by:  (1) permitting violations of foreign and federal 
laws and Wal-Mart’s code of ethics; (2) permitting the obstruction of an adequate 
investigation of known potential (and/or actual) violations of foreign and federal 
laws; and (3) covering up (or attempting to cover up) known potential (and/or actual) 
violations of foreign and federal laws.” 241 In short, the complaint “consistently 
implie[d] that Defendants should have or must have known about the alleged 
                                                          
 236 See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1029-30 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 237 See, e.g., Nathan Vardi, Plaintiff Lawyers Join the Bribery Racket, FORBES (Aug. 16, 
2010), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2010/08/16/plaintiff-lawyers-fcpa-bribery-
racket/#689fdef43e50. 
 238 Just Because the FCPA is Not Commonly the Subject of Litigation Does Not Create a 
Substantial Federal Interest in State Law Claims Related to the FCPA, FCPA PROFESSOR 
(Mar. 26, 2015), http://fcpaprofessor.com/just-because-the-fcpa-is-not-commonly-the-subject-
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 239 See, e.g., Wal-Mart’s FCPA Scrutiny Grows, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 21, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/wal-marts-fcpa-scrutiny-grows. 
 240 See, e.g., Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (June 8, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-43 (highlighting recent disclosure from Wal-
Mart regarding civil suits). 
 241 In re Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. 4:12-CV-4041 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 31, 2015) (dismissing 
case).     
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misconduct by virtue of their positions and the supposed reporting structure at Wal-
Mart.”242  
Like the fate of many such FCPA-related civil suits, the suit was dismissed as the 
court stated, “Nothing in the Complaint suggests any particularized basis to infer that 
a majority of the Board had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged 
misconduct, let alone that they acted improperly with scienter.”243 
A second type of FCPA-related civil claim frequently brought in the aftermath of 
FCPA scrutiny or enforcement is a securities fraud action. In such actions, plaintiff 
shareholders allege that the company and various executive officers violate Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act by making false or misleading statements 
concerning the company’s business and/or its compliance with the FCPA or related 
laws.244  
For instance, in connection with its FCPA scrutiny Hyperdynamics shareholders 
brought such a claim.245 The shareholders alleged that the company’s prior 
statements regarding FCPA compliance were false or misleading statements by 
omission.246 The alleged FCPA violations occurred when the company made 
“donations to the government of Guinea during three phases of negotiations” 
concerning a project.247 However, the court dismissed the complaint and concluded, 
“Plaintiffs have not alleged FCPA-related facts which would render either the 
[disclosures] misleading by omission and which Defendants had a duty to disclose. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts which would render the specific 
denials false or misleading.”248 In pertinent part, after reviewing the FCPA’s 
statutory scheme, the court stated, “[The FCPA's anti-bribery provision] does not bar 
a company from giving anything of value to a foreign government, as opposed to a 
foreign official personally, or to a third party such as a nonprofit in order to generate 
corporate goodwill, even if the gift indirectly influences government officials.”249 
This was a notable statement in that it followed on the heels of the above-
mentioned BNY Mellon FCPA enforcement action,250 an action not subjected to any 
judicial scrutiny, in which the SEC found that BNY Mellon violated the FCPA’s 
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 244 See, e.g., Development From The “Other Universe”—In Dismissing FCPA-Related 
Securities Fraud Claims, Judge Repudiates FCPA Enforcement Theory, FCPA PROFESSOR 
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 247 Parker v. Hyperdynamics Corp., 126 F. Supp. 3d 830, 844 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
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anti-bribery provisions by providing internships to family members of alleged 
“foreign officials” because the internships “were valuable work experience[s], and 
the requesting officials derived significant personal value in being able to confer this 
benefit on their family members.”251  
The above dichotomy demonstrates that FCPA issues often co-exist in two 
parallel universes. One universe is ruled by all-powerful gods with big and sharp 
sticks in which subjects would not dare challenge the gods.252 Another universe 
consists of checks and balances in which independent actors call the balls and 
strikes.253 The first universe refers to FCPA enforcement by the DOJ and SEC. The 
second universe refers to litigation of FCPA-related claims in which judges make 
decisions in the context of an adversarial legal system.254 The second universe is 
often referred to as the rule of law universe, and the above decision in the 
Hyperdynamics case is telling for the reasons discussed above.255 
A final FCPA-related civil litigation development from 2015 raises the question 
of where the truth lies in FCPA enforcement. In other words, if the DOJ and/or SEC 
make allegations in a FCPA enforcement action, and a risk-averse corporation agrees 
to resolve the enforcement action in the absence of judicial scrutiny, does that mean 
the allegations are true?256 As an FCPA-related civil suit against Hewlett-Packard 
Co. (HP) demonstrates, the answer is not necessarily.  
In terms of background, a component of the 2014 HP FCPA enforcement action 
involved DOJ and SEC allegations concerning improper business conduct in 
Mexico.257 Specifically, in a non-prosecution agreement, the DOJ alleged that HP 
Mexico indirectly made cash payments to a Pemex Chief Information Officer in 
order to obtain contracts and the SEC found the same in an administrative order.258 
Notably, neither resolution vehicle was subjected to any judicial scrutiny. 
Interestingly, in the aftermath of the enforcement action, Pemex brought a civil 
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Fraud Claims, Judge States that Merely Conducting Business in Countries “Rife with 
Corruption Does Not Demonstrate Knowledge of FCPA Violations”, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 
20, 2016), http://fcpaprofessor.com/development-universe-dismissing-fcpa-related-securities-
fraud-claims-judge-states-merely-conducting-business-countries-rife-corruption-not-
demonstrate-knowled/. 
 253 Id.  
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Where Does the Truth Lie?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 21, 2015), 
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 257 See DOJ Non-Prosecution Agreement, DOJ (Apr. 9, 2014), 
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claim against HP alleging that HP paid bribes to win the Pemex contracts.259 In 
defense, HP pointed to a Pemex annual report that stated: 
On April 9, 2014, the SEC issued an order imposing sanctions against 
Hewlett-Packard Company (or HP) based on its findings that HP’s 
subsidiaries in Mexico, Russia and Poland made improper payments to 
certain public officials in order to obtain public contracts in violation of 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In the case related to Mexico, the 
sanctions related in part to allegations that [HP Mexico] paid a Mexican 
information-technology and consulting company more than U.S. $1 
million to win a software and licensing contract with [Pemex] worth 
approximately U.S. $6 million. The SEC’s order alleged that a former 
officer of [Pemex] received a portion of the HP subsidiary’s unlawful 
payment to the consulting company. The Internal Control Body of 
[Pemex] concluded its investigation after finding no improper payment.260 
The civil action against HP was ultimately dismissed.261 So where does the truth 
lie:  did HP make an improper payment to a Pemex official or not? The public will 
likely never know, but this much is true. The DOJ and SEC allegations, while 
accepted by a risk averse company, were not subjected to any judicial scrutiny. 
Moreover, there are no consequences to the DOJ and SEC should the allegations not 
be accurate and there is no accountability for untrue statements. On the other hand, 
Pemex’s statement was contained in an SEC filing and are thus statements to the 
market actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for false or misleading 
statements.262  
2. Historic Firsts in the U.K. 
The U.S. is not the only country with a law prohibiting bribery of foreign 
officials for a business purpose. For instance, in 2011 the U.K. Bribery Act 
(“Bribery Act”) went into effect and this section highlights two historic firsts that 
occurred in the U.K. in 2015.263 
Prior to discussing these developments, this section provides relevant 
background regarding the Bribery Act and its early enforcement. The Bribery Act 
replaced a hodgepodge of antiquated U.K. bribery and corruption statutes that 
generally required a “controlling mind” of a corporation (generally a member of the 
board of directors or a high-ranking executive) to be involved in the alleged 
improper conduct in order to criminally charge the entity.264  
                                                          
 259 See In the Matter of Hewlett-Packard Co., supra note 257. 
 260 Where Does the Truth Lie?, supra note 256. 
 261 See Pemex Ends Corruption Suit Against HP, THE RECORDER (Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202741754885/Pemex-Ends-Corruption-Suit-Against-
HP#ixzz3rHK37i9H. 
 262 Where Does the Truth Lie?, supra note 256. 
 263 See The Bribery Act 2010, Guidance, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2016) [hereinafter The Bribery Act 2010]. 
 264 Id. 
48https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol65/iss2/6
2017] FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 205 
 
To bypass this general U.K. legal principle, the Bribery Act contains a so-called 
“failure to prevent bribery offense” which provides that a commercial organization 
will be subject to prosecution if a person associated with the corporation bribes 
another person intending to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct 
of business for that organization.265 However, the Bribery Act also contains a so-
called “adequate procedures defense” which provides that a “commercial 
organization will have a full defense if it can show that despite a particular case of 
bribery it nevertheless had adequate procedures in place to prevent persons 
associated with it from bribing.”266 According to the U.K. Ministry of Justice 
(“MOJ”), the adequate-procedures defense is included in the Bribery Act “to 
encourage commercial organizations to put procedures in place to prevent bribery by 
persons associated with them,”267 and “the objective of the Bribery Act is not to 
bring the full force of the criminal law to bear upon well run commercial 
organizations that experience an isolated incident of bribery on their behalf.”268 
Related to Bribery Act enforcement, in 2014 U.K. prosecutors gained 
authorization to use deferred prosecution agreements to resolve alleged instances of 
corporate fraud including Bribery Act offenses.269 Even though the U.K. adopted a 
DPA regime, it is materially different from the U.S. DPA regime in that the U.K. 
regime contemplates active and early involvement by the judiciary.270 
Against this backdrop, two historic firsts occurred in the U.K. in a 2015 
enforcement action against Standard Bank:  (i) the first use of the so-called failure to 
prevent bribery offense in a foreign bribery action and (ii) the first use of a deferred 
prosecution agreement in the U.K.271 
In terms of “what” was resolved in the $25 million Standard Bank (“SB”) 
enforcement action—a violation of the Bribery Act’s failure to prevent bribery 
offense—the key points from the enforcement action—all based on the Serious 
Fraud Office’s272 charging document and/or the court’s judgment—were as follows. 
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• The enforcement action against SB was based on the conduct of its former 
“sister company” (Stanbic Bank Tanzania Limited (ST)) and two former 
employees at ST in relation to just one transaction.273 
• The transaction was a private placement offering for the Government of 
Tanzania (GOT).274 
• In connection with the transaction, SB connected due diligence on GOT and 
the enforcement action found no fault in this regard.275 
• However, the enforcement action faulted SB for not conducting effective 
diligence on a local partner inserted into the transaction by ST.276 
• SB’s oversight in this regard was the result of an apparent misunderstanding 
at SB based on—in the words of the SFO—“a reasonable interpretation” of 
SB’s own written guidelines.277 
• The end result was that SB relied on ST to conduct due diligence and to 
raise any concerns regarding the local partner. Indeed, the SFO alleged that 
SB was provided a “two page checklist from ST of the steps it had taken” in 
regards to due diligence of the local partner.278 
• SB’s alleged failure, however, was in allowing—and trusting—that its sister 
company would conduct effective due diligence of a local partner in one 
transaction.279 
• As stated by the Judge, “[T]he SFO has reached the conclusion that there is 
insufficient evidence to suggest that any of Standard Bank’s employees 
committed a [bribery] offence: whilst a payment of US $6 million was 
made available to EGMA (the local partner), the evidence does not 
demonstrate with the appropriate cogency that anyone within Standard 
Bank knew that two senior executives of Stanbic intended the payment to 
constitute a bribe, or so intended it themselves.”280 
• Elsewhere, the Judge repeated, “The evidence does not reveal that 
executives or employees of Standard Bank intended or knew of an intention 
to bribe.”281 
• The above-alleged conduct occurred against the backdrop of SB having—as 
specifically highlighted in the resolution documents—various policies and 
procedures designed to the same conduct giving rising to the enforcement 
action.282 
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• Indeed, the SFO’s statement of facts contained an appendix titled “Training 
Schedule and Interview Excerpts re Training & Awareness of Policies” and 
identified—for three SB employees—extensive training courses and dates 
completed.283 
• SB’s alleged failure also took place against the backdrop of—in the words 
of the Judge—“Standard Bank [having] no previous convictions for bribery 
and corruption nor has it been the subject of any other criminal 
investigations by the SFO.”284 
• Moreover, the Judge stated, “[T]here is no evidence that the failure to raise 
concerns about anti-bribery and corruption risks . . . was more widespread 
within the organization.”285 
In terms of “how” the enforcement action was resolved (the U.K.’s first DPA), 
the judge who approved the DPA complimented SB’s voluntary disclosure and 
cooperation and stated, 
Standard Bank immediately reported itself to the authorities and adopted a 
genuinely proactive approach to the matter . . . In this regard, the 
promptness of the self-report and the extent to which the prosecutor has 
been involved are to be taken into account . . . In this case, the disclosure 
was within days of the suspicions coming to the Bank’s attention, and 
before its solicitors had commenced (let alone completed) its own 
investigation. 
 
Credit must also be given for self-reporting which might otherwise have 
remained unknown to the prosecutor. . . . In this regard, the trigger for the 
disclosure was incidents that occurred overseas which were reported by 
Stanbic’s employees to Standard Bank Group. Were it not for the internal 
escalation and proactive approach of Standard Bank and Standard Bank 
Group that led to self-disclosure, the conduct at issue may not otherwise 
have come to the attention of the SFO. 
. . . . 
 
Standard Bank fully cooperated with the SFO from the earliest possible 
date by, among other things, providing a summary of first accounts of 
interviewees, facilitating the interviews of current employees, providing 
timely and complete responses to requests for information and material 
and providing access to its document review platform. The Bank has 
agreed to continue to cooperate fully and truthfully with the SFO and any 
other agency or authority, domestic or foreign, as directed by the SFO, in 
any and all matters relating to the conduct which is the subject matter of 
the present DPA. Suffice to say, this self-reporting and cooperation 
                                                          
 283 Id. at 272. 
 284 Preliminary Judgment, supra note 280, at 8. 
 285 Id. at 13 (containing links to the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, the Statement of 
Facts, the preliminary judgment and full judgment). 
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militates very much in favour of finding that a DPA is likely to be in the 
interests of justice.286 
In conclusion, the judge stated: 
It is obviously in the interests of justice that the SFO has been able to 
investigate the circumstances in which a UK registered bank acquiesced 
in an arrangement (however unwittingly) which had many hallmarks of 
bribery on a large scale and which both could and should have been 
prevented. Neither should it be thought that, in the hope of getting away 
with it, Standard Bank would have been better served by taking a course 
which did not involve self report, investigation and provisional agreement 
to a DPA with the substantial compliance requirements and financial 
implications that follow. For my part, I have no doubt that Standard Bank 
has far better served its shareholders, its customers and its employees (as 
well as all those with whom it deals) by demonstrating its recognition of 
its serious failings and its determination in the future to adhere to the 
highest standards of banking. Such an approach can itself go a long way 
to repairing and, ultimately, enhancing its reputation and, in consequence, 
its business. It can also serve to underline the enormous importance which 
is rightly attached to the culture of compliance with the highest ethical 
standards that is so essential to banking in this country.287 
David Green (Director of the SFO) stated that the SB DPA was a “landmark 
DPA [that] will serve as a template for future agreements”288 Ben Morgan (Joint 
Head of Bribery and Corruption at the SFO) applauded the conduct of SB and its 
counsel and stated:  “It is maybe strange for a prosecutor to say—but credit to the 
parties involved for the way they have dealt with a corruption incident once it has 
surfaced. The bank, certain of its employees and its advisers . . . have had the 
courage to innovate where others will now follow.”289 
However, beyond the pomp and circumstance of the historic nature of the SB 
action, it raises several important issues as the U.K. begins to enforce the Bribery 
Act and begins to use DPAs. For instance, given the SFO’s allegations and judicial 
findings, it is curious why SB even voluntarily disclosed the conduct at issue, 
particularly in light of the Bribery Act’s adequate procedures defense.290 In pertinent 
part, the SB action would appear, based on the allegations, to be an instance where 
an otherwise well-run commercial organization experienced an isolated instance of 
bribery in its organization—a circumstance in which the U.K. MOJ previously said 
was not the goal of the Bribery Act.291 
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In short, the U.K.’s first use of the “failure to prevent bribery” offense seems 
dubious (albeit with judicial blessing). As U.K. practitioner Eoin O’Shea observed: 
The issue of whether the company might have had a defence of “adequate 
procedures” to a section 7 charge was also considered by the court, albeit 
briefly, when considering culpability. The discussion here is 
disappointing because it focuses on the specific compliance problems 
connected to the conduct in Tanzania, rather than whether there was an 
effective anti-bribery policy or culture across the bank as a whole. I’m not 
sure this is the right approach. When sentencing an organisation, it is 
relevant to consider whether the misfeasance was a case of “a few bad 
apples” or more widespread systemic failings.292 
Likewise, practitioners at Gibson Dunn stated, “[A] number of important 
elements of the [failure to prevent bribery] offence are not addressed in detail in [the 
SB] judgment, and will remain a source of uncertainty for corporations in 
considering their exposure under that offence.”293  
Yet, the first “failure to prevent bribery” enforcement action in the U.K. is 
similar to several FCPA enforcement actions294 where the enforcement theory seems 
to be, with the benefit of perfect hindsight, to zero in on one transaction (against the 
universe of thousands of similar transactions) to find an FCPA violation in what 
amounts to a “should have, could have, would have” theory of liability.295 
Relevant to SB’s disclosure, the resolution documents state, “The disclosure was 
within days of the suspicions coming to the Bank’s attention, and before its solicitors 
had commenced (let alone completed) its own investigation.”296 Given this context, 
SB’s disclosure (far from being “innovative’) could be viewed as premature, 
careless, and indeed reckless. But then again, counsel to SB (like counsel in FCPA 
or other related internal investigations) no doubt secured substantially more in legal 
fees by making the disclosure compared to the other reasonable alternative of not 
disclosing and remedying any internal control deficiencies.297 In addition, the SB 
DPA imposes upon SB various post-enforcement action compliance obligations that 
will further increase the company’s professional fees and expenses.298 
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Notwithstanding the important issues raised by the SB action (and perhaps not 
too much should be read into the action as it was, after all, only one action), it was 
nevertheless incredibly refreshing to read resolution documents in connection with 
an alleged corporate bribery offense drafted by someone other than the prosecuting 
authority as frequently happens in the U.S. given the prominence of NPAs, DPAs, 
and SEC administrative orders to resolve corporate FCPA enforcement actions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the FCPA nears its 40th anniversary, 2015 was a commemorative year that 
witnessed several notable developments. The goal of this article was to paint a 
picture for anyone seeking an informed base of knowledge regarding the FCPA and 
related legal and policy issues in the FCPA’s modern era; dissecting FCPA 
enforcement in a number of ways and highlighting statistics from 2015 as well as 
historical comparisons and discussing a range of noteworthy issues from 2015 such 
as expansive and evolving FCPA enforcement theories,299 judicial scrutiny of FCPA 
and related enforcement theories,300 policy pronouncements and developments 
relevant to FCPA issues,301 and developments beyond the FCPA that nevertheless 
touch upon FCPA issues or are otherwise relevant to a similar space.302  
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